Andreas Wiedemann (Princeton)

Redistributive Politics Under Spatial Inequality: How Electoral Rules Undermine Political Responses to Rising Inequality

View the webinar here.

Abstract

Why has rising inequality not led to more redistribution? And what explains the cross-national variation in countries’ responses (or lack thereof) to inequality? Combining insights from electoral geography with political economy models of redistributive politics and partisan strategies, I argue that the spatial distribution of inequality undermines the political logic of redistribution when elections are held under plurality rule. When inequality in the median electoral district is lower than in the nation as a whole, the demand for redistributive policies and voting for left-leaning parties is concentrated in a few districts. This limits the number of seats left-wing parties gain in elections and disincentivizes left-wing parties from offering pro-redistributive platforms. I provide empirical evidence to support my argument using cross-national data on regional inequalities, local-level administrative and geocoded survey data from the United Kingdom, and comparative manifesto data. The findings offer a new explanation of why some countries redistribute more than others, which suggests that political geography can weaken political responses to inequality and electoral representation.