Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability (with James R. Hollyer and James Raymond Vreeland), forthcoming, British Journal of Political Science.

Why do Autocrats Disclose? Economic Transparency and Inter-Elite Politics in the Shadow of Mass Unrest (with James R. Hollyer and James Raymond Vreeland), Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2019, 63(6), 1488–1516.

The Millennium Development Goals and Education: Accountability and Substitution in Global Assessment (with James Bisbee, James Hollyer and James Vreeland), forthcoming, International Organization.

Government Choices over Borrowing Strategies (with Eric Arias and Layna Mosley).

Decompensating Domestically: The Political Economy of Anti-Globalism (with James Bisbee, Layna Mosley, Thomas Pepinsky)



Information, Democracy, and Autocracy: Economic Transparency and Political (In)Stability (with James R. Hollyer and James Raymond Vreeland), Cambridge University Press. 

Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness and Bilateral Investment Treaties (with James Hollyer and Eric Arias), American Journal of Political Science. October 2018, 62(4): 905-921. Supplementary Information and Dataverse.

Domestic Political Determinants of the Onset of WTO Disputes (with Alastair Smith), Review of International Organizations,  June 2018, 13(2): 243–272.

Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work Hypothesis (with Valentin Lang, Axel Dreher and James Raymond Vreeland), CEPR Discussion Paper 13290.  Summary at VoxEU.

Transparency and Forms of Investment (with James R. Hollyer and James Raymond Vreeland).


Why Multilateralism? The Role of the Periphery in Optimal Trade Agreements, (with Renee Bowen).

Globalization and the Erosion of Liberal Democracy. Prepared for the Challenges to the Contemporary World Order Workshop, Filzbach, Switzerland, 6-8 October 2017 


Transparency, Protest and Autocratic Instability (with James R. Hollyer and James Raymond Vreeland),  American Political Science Review, November 2015, 109(4): 764-784

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Michael J. Gilligan, and B. Peter Rosendorff, The Good News about International Cooperation: A Tribute to the Life and Work of George W. Downs, A special virtual issue of International Organization, In Memoriam: George Downs, Pioneering Scholar. April 2015.

Regime Type and International Commercial Agreements (with Kongjoo Shin),  International Journal of Economic Theory,  March 2015, 11(1): 107–119

Domestic Politics and International Trade Disputes,  in Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Trade, ed. Lisa Martin, Oxford University Press.

Domestic Politics of Trade Policy (with Michael Aklin, Eric Arias and Emine Deniz) in Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences  Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn (eds.), Hoboken, NJ:  John Wiley and SonsData Disclosure, Accountability and the Facets of Transparency (with James Hollyer and James Raymond Vreeland)

Political Change, Domestic Institutions and the Onset of Anti-Dumping Investigations (with Alastair Smith and Patricia Wruuck)


Measuring Transparency (with James R. Hollyer and James Raymond Vreeland), Political Analysis, Autumn 2014, 22(4):413-434.


Importing Transparency: The Political Economy of BITs and FDI Flows (with Kongjoo Shin).


Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession, International Studies Quarterly, 56(4):748-764 (with James Hollyer).

The International Human Rights Regime Delays Regime Change in the Countries that Need it Most,  forthcoming, Implementing Commitments: The Domestic Effects of Human Rights Treaty Ratification, eds. Beth Simmons and Ryan Goodman, Cambridge University Press (with James Hollyer).

Do Human Rights Agreements Prolong the Tenure of Autocratic Ratifiers?Journal of International Law and Politics, Spring, 44(3):791-811 (with James Hollyer).


Democracy and TransparencyJournal of Politics, October, 73(4):1191-1205, (with James Hollyer and James Raymond Vreeland).

Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics and Non-ComplianceQuarterly Journal of Political Science, 6(3-4):275-327 (with James Hollyer).


Suicide Terror and the Backlash Effect, Defense and Peace Economics, October, 21(5-6):443-458 (with Todd Sandler).

Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(1):4-38, (with Michael J. Gilligan and Leslie Johns). Technical Appendix.


A Gravity Model of Globalization, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism in Gregory D. Hess, Guns and Butter: The Economic Causes and Consequences of Conflict, June. Cambridge: MIT Press (with Brock Blomberg).

Dispute Settlement, Compliance and Domestic Politics,in James C. Hartigan (ed.) Trade Disputes and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: An Interdisciplinary Assessment, Emerald Group (with Leslie Johns).


Transparency and Unfair Eviction in Democracies and Autocracies, Swiss Political Science Review, October 2006, 12(3):99-112 (with John Doces).

Domestic Politics and Enforcement of International AgreementsThe Political Economist, XIII(2), Spring-Summer 2006.

Do Democracies Trade More Freely?, in Robert Pahre ed. Democratic Foreign Policy Making: Problems of Divided Government and International Cooperation, London: Palgrave, 2006.

The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism, Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 2005, 49(2):171-182 (with Todd Sandler).

Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Dispute Resolution Mechanism at the WTOAmerican Political Science Review, August 2005, 99(3):389-400.

Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004, 48(5):657-671 (with Todd Sandler).

International Trade and Domestic Politics: The Domestic Sources of International Trade Agreements and Institutions, in Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch, eds, The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 (with Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner).

Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade, American Political Science Review, 2002, 96(1):167- 69, (with Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner).

Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, International Organization, 2002, 56(3):477 – 514, Fall (with Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner).

Choosing Democracy, Economics and Politics, 2001, 13(1):1- 29.

The Optimal Design of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, International Organization, 2001, 55(4): 829 – 857, Winter (with Helen Milner).

Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade Negotiations, American Political Science Review, 2000, 94(2): 305 – 322, June. Figures, (with Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner).

Democratic Politics and International trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1997, 41(1): 117-147 (with Helen Milner).

Voluntary Export Restraints, Anti-Dumping Procedure and Domestic Politics, American Economic Review, 1996, 86(3): 544-561.

Endogenous Trade Restrictions and Domestic Political Pressure in Robert C. Feenstra, Gene M. Grossman and Doug Irwin, eds., The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Essays in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.

A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5:44-70 (with Charles Cameron).