Language policy, ethnic conflict, and conflict resolution: Albanian in the former Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{12}

Daniel Duncan, New York University
July 2015

1. Introduction

The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s were marked by vicious ethnic conflict as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) broke up into seven nation-states\textsuperscript{3}. The independence of these states did not bring the end of conflict, however. Each had to navigate the reality of incorporating ethnic minority populations into the recently developed nationalist discourse, and post-Yugoslav language policies responded to "perceived threats to linguistic or national viability" (Friedman 2004: 219). For Albanians in particular, there was a sense of discrimination from the new states they resided in. While they had formed a sizable minority in SFRJ, they were now scattered across many states: they constitute a majority in Kosovo, with large minority populations in Macedonia and Serbia (Judah 2008: 3-5). Thus, the end of SFRJ marked the end of traditional language contact in the region (Hill 2011: 411), as well as the end of what Bugarski (2004) describes as an "internationally acclaimed" policy of language equality (p. 189). Asserting a nation's rights against those of a minority nationality is a difficult balance to strike, and ethnic conflicts began anew in Serbia and Macedonia, and remained intractable in Kosovo.

Albanians' efforts centered on demands for improved language rights, including use of the Albanian language in the spheres of education, media and administration. That the groups' grievances focused on language highlights two important points: the speakers of that language

\textsuperscript{1} This is a pre-publication draft; the article is "To appear" in Language Policy.

\textsuperscript{2} Thanks to Sibelean Forrester and Lee Smithey for their support and comments on an early version of this as my thesis at Swarthmore College, as well John Cox for his discussion and comments during examination. This project would not have begun were it not for productive conversations with Orli Fridman regarding the status of language in the Balkans. Additional thanks to John Singler for his comments, as well as suggesting sources. Finally, thank you to two anonymous reviewers, whose comments have greatly strengthened the final product. Any remaining errors are my own.

\textsuperscript{3} In this paper I treat Kosovo, whose 2008 independence is disputed, as an independent state.
encountered *structural violence* from language policies in their daily lives, and language use is the key to defining identity for these speakers. With that in mind, this paper discusses the link between language policies and ethnic conflict in the region. While previous studies have addressed the contribution of debates surrounding the local Slavic languages to conflict (see Franolić 1980; Tollefson 2002), I instead focus on language policy toward Albanians in the former SFRJ. Because language rights were closely tied to *territory* rather than populations (Tollefson 2002: 69), I compare policies in three regions with sizable Albanian populations: Serbia's Preševo Valley, Kosovo, and Macedonia (see Zymberi 1991; Friedman 2004 for older studies of Kosovo and Macedonia). Previous studies of Albanian language policy and planning typically discuss the language in a pre-breakup context (Byron 1979; Byron 1985; Zymberi 1991), and the recent conflicts have made a study of language policy somewhat difficult (Bugarski 2004). To that end, I place an emphasis on understanding the role of language in the promotion and *perpetuation* of conflict in the region. As such, this paper proceeds with a brief history of Yugoslavia and discussion of language policy and conflict in section 2, followed by a short history of language policies in the region from the time of the Ottoman Empire to 1945 in section 3. From there, the three case studies in section 4 will enable a discussion in section 5 of why conflict in Kosovo, for example, remains intractable, while that in Serbia has been resolved relatively successfully. I argue that while assimilationist language policies serve as both indicator/cause of conflict, policies emphasizing balanced bilingualism may be seen as a potential tool for conflict resolution.

2. **Background**

   It is impossible to give a full history of the formation and dissolution of SFRJ in the limited space here (see Silber and Little 1997; Judah 2008, inter alia for far more detail);
however, some background is necessary. SFRJ was founded in 1945 by Josip Broz Tito and the communists who fought as Partisans in World War II. It was composed of six republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia—and two autonomous provinces within Serbia—Kosovo and Vojvodina. Tito essentially controlled SFRJ; after his death in 1980, power was decentralized, as there were nine presidents wielding executive power: one for each republic and autonomous province, plus the head of the League of Communists. This decentralization plus an economic crisis through the 1980s provided favorable conditions for political fracturing based on ethnic nationalism and calls for democratization. In 1991, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Croatia seceded, followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 (itself a reaction to Serbs declaring their own secession from the republic). This triggered the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, marked by atrocities and war crimes. While six conflicts comprised the Yugoslav Wars, relevant here are the Kosovo War, ended by the 1999 NATO intervention and bombing of Serbia, as well as the 1999-2001 conflict in the Preševo Valley of Serbia and 2001 conflict in Macedonia. The Kosovo War ended with UN administration of Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Serbia does not recognize this, and only 108 of 193 UN members (23 of 28 EU members, four of six ex-Yugoslav states) recognize Kosovo as a state.

Language played a role in the buildup of ethnic nationalism during the 1980s, both in Albanian agitation for greater language rights and Serbian and Macedonian reactionary repression of language rights. Despite this, its impact is often overlooked, seen in claims that linguistic diversity obscures more important differences in the region (Duijzings 2000). Though it is a prominent characteristic of the region, this very fact emphasizes its importance. Languages are inextricably linked to ethnic identities. Often ethnic contact is first manifested in
language contact (Nećak-Lük 1997: 28), and as such is a symbol used to draw from the past and legitimize identities (Seneviratne 2005: 138).

My goal here is to explicitly link language policy and ethnic conflict, much as Wright (1997) links language policy to inter- and intrastate conflict. As occurred in SFRJ, ethnic conflict often first appears in the form of issues involving communication and language maintenance (Williams 1997: 430). When these questions of language use go unaddressed, the imbalance can mobilize people's sentiments, escalating the matter into what is traditionally termed ethnic conflict. Even when language is not the immediate issue in a conflict, it takes on a highly symbolic role. An institutionalized majority language with little support for minority languages highlights imbalances in social class and power between the two (Darquennes 2011: 548).

Imbalanced language policies may be characterized as *structural violence*, defined by Galtung (1969) as social injustice: unequal institutions yield unequal chances in life for its victims (p. 171). This can be seen if we consider the opportunities available to a speaker of a national language, as opposed to one of a local minority language. Employment and access to social institutions are easier for the former, especially when linguistic rights of the minority are restricted. This view of language policy in many ways echoes that of Skutnabb-Kangas (1997; 2001), particularly her take on state policies of assimilation and discrimination. It is consistent, however, with other views on language policy and linguistic diversity. Consider views of language as environmental resource (Maffi 2005, Romaine 2007) or tool for access to citizenship (Heller 2013) or neoliberal economic development (da Silva and Heller 2009). Under these views, discriminatory language policies constitute destruction of resources, "dis-citizenship"
(Heller 2013), or denial of economic opportunity. Each of these, particularly the latter two, fall under the definition of structural violence.

It is well-established that language standardization and nation-building go hand in hand (Hobsbawm 1992; May 2001; Zahra 2008; Heller 2013). Uniting based on a standardized language allows for maximum comprehensibility within the nation, while at the same time maximizing differences between the nation and its neighbors (Milroy and Milroy 1991). Standardization reflects the political goals of the elites, who cannot push for a nation's independence without convincing the people that they are in fact a nation. To achieve this, the language is planned in three stages: status, corpus, and acquisition (Wright 2011: 780-82). In the case of the Balkans, the South Slavic languages form a dialect continuum between the Eastern Alps and the Black Sea (Wright 1997: 231). This means their division into Slovenian, Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian is more a political project designed to claim native speakers and territory than a natural distinction. While Albanian is an isolate branch of Indo-European, quite different from Slavic, its standardization into a single language is no less political. Thus, the act of standardizing languages enabled the demarcation of the national groups (many with eponymous nation-states) that seem so fixed today. As real as they seem, these ethnic groups are nevertheless imagined (Anderson 1991).

Nation building creates linguistic majorities as it promotes and requires convergence to a national culture and language. Those who do not or cannot make this move are constructed as linguistic minorities. Movements of linguistic nationalism thus created a system in which there

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4 The breakup of SFRJ coincided with the dissolution of Serbo-Croatian into Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian. Henceforth, I call the language Serbo-Croatian when discussing events before the breakup and Serbian when discussing events after the breakup.

5 Albanian has two main dialects: Gheg (spoken in Kosovo and northern Albania) and Tosk (spoken in Albania). Although 19th century nationalists considered uniting these, until 1968, these dialects both had a literary register and between 1945-1968 in particular, SFRJ Albanians standardized the Gheg dialect while those in Albania standardized the Tosk dialect. In 1968, Albanians in Kosovo shifted their standard from their local Gheg dialect to the Tosk dialect of Albania (Byron 1979; Byron 1985).
is a clear majority and clear minority (Wright 2011: 782). The nation-state is inherently violent, then, as identification with one nation demands an identification with one language. It is difficult to promote one nation without it coming at the expense of other minorities, and the state culture promoted by nationalist ideologies makes structural violence toward minorities feel natural and necessary, alienating the Other and treating them as a second-class citizen (Galtung 1990: 293-99). This in turn serves to solidify the minority as a group. Brubaker (2004) writes of groups as a process and event. In this view, conflict is what forms the cohesiveness of groups, and the group is performed through the encouragement of agents and events. The group is not a group per se, then, but rather a degree of groupness (Brubaker 2004: 8-15). In this sense, it is not difficult to see how negative policies toward a language could encourage its speakers to coalesce into a group. Nationalist ideologies require the local majority to assert a strong identity through excluding the minority, often restricting linguistic rights of the minority, including eradicating minority languages in favor of national ones. This backfires when minority groups defensively emphasize the necessity of their own culture and language (Jacquemet 2005: 263-264).

Recognizing that discriminatory language policies are violent and linked to conflict provides an argument for strong language rights. While the right to one's language has been recognized for some time, the interpretation of this varies between that of negative rights—the right to speak one's language without fear of punishment—and positive rights—the right to use one's language in state institutions or public space (Hogan-Brun and Wright 2013: 243; Wright 2007). The former would permit states to encourage assimilation, so long as those who chose to continue speaking their native language were allowed to do so. However, positive language rights represent an obligation of the state to not only permit use of a particular language, but actively support the communities that use it. This may seem problematic in conflict situations:
positive language rights are group rights that require minorities to "reinforce internal cohesion and encourage convergence among those on the periphery" (Hogan-Brun and Wright 2013: 243). As such, they appear to reify the group and be exclusionary. However, Skutnabb-Kangas (1997) envisions these rights as reducing conflict, if applied correctly (p. 319). This makes sense in the context of the Balkans. Among people who already have a high degree of groupness from conflict, positive language rights would not serve to further increase groupness; rather, they would contribute to ameliorating the situation causing increased groupness.

3. Regional Language Policy Before 1945

The denial of linguistic rights in the Balkans has been a tradition of the region since the time of the Ottoman Empire. The region was historically multilingual, divided by religious groups in the millet system (Tanasković 1991: 145; Mazower 2000: xv; Friedman 2003: 261). This changed in the 19th century when several non-Muslim communities began following the Western example and agitating for autonomy. This marked the beginning of linguistic nationalism in the region (Greenberg 2004: 9). National print languages became of the utmost importance (Anderson 1991: 67), and there was an explosion of local print media beginning in the 18th century. Language standardization served to position an ethnic group not only in opposition to the Ottoman Empire, but in opposition to other groups as well (Bakić-Hayden 1995: 917). These movements advanced at different paces—by 1830, the Greek and Serbian nations had been viably created, while the Albanian and Macedonian nations were not yet conceptualized (Mazower 2000: 89).

The 1878 Treaty of Berlin gave independence to Serbia and Montenegro (Johanson 2011: 730). Under the treaty, Serbia received lands with Bulgarian and Albanian speakers, and annexed them brutally (Judah 2008: 35), with attempts to assimilate the non-Serb population
(Durham 1920). Additionally, Slavs were resettled in the Albanian areas (Durham 1905: 65). Along with Greece, the new states had designs on the rest of Ottoman Macedonia, which was not a clearly defined territory but included several Albanian-speaking vilayets (Mazower 2000: 98). Elites of this region feared expansion from the new states (Judah 2008: 10), and created the League of Prizren, which advocated for an independent Greater Albania. This organization originally worked with the Ottomans, but was put down in 1881 (Judah 2008: 36). By that time, though, the League had created an ecumenical Albanian identity based on language—an important point, as Albanian speakers were mostly Muslim, but with significant numbers of Orthodox Christians and Catholics (Duijzings 2000).

Creating a language-based identity was no easy task. As the Ottomans watched groups that standardized their languages earlier in the 19th century demand first autonomy and then independence, they forbade education in other local languages in an effort to maintain control. Thus, Albanian-language education was banned, replaced by Greek. For Orthodox Christians in this part of the Balkans, Greek was an enforced language in the church as well (Durham 1920). The policy made it difficult to create a language-based identity, as there was no print media tradition or even a standardized alphabet to draw on (Durham 1904). Despite these limitations, the Albanian identity caught hold. The language was not permitted in schools or books, but found a place with Western assistance. As an example, because the Ottoman Empire permitted translations of the Bible, a printer in London made one, which proved popular with Christians and Muslims alike (Durham 2001). Durham discusses meeting with an Ottoman official who displayed the government's fear of Albanian nationalism, yet believed this was a problem that could be fixed with the imposition of Turkish language education (Durham 1905: 213-224).
Even so, the Albanian language was secretly taught by Albanians (Byron 1979: 21), and openly taught by foreigners.

The occasional assistance extended to the Albanian language was one example of how the European Great Powers treated the Balkans as a proxy for their power struggles. Any successful rebellion against the Ottoman Empire would require Great Power support. Outside support was not forthcoming for Albanian nationalists, and the Albanian movement instead eventually found traction with the Ottoman Empire. By 1912 it was ready to satisfy Albanian demands for autonomy, uniting modern Albania and Kosovo in one region (Adanir 2011: 119). The surrounding states would not stand for this, and launched the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

Albania became an independent state in the aftermath of the wars, albeit a much smaller one than its leaders had hoped. While Albania claimed every region with a substantial Albanian-speaking population, including modern day Kosovo and parts of Ottoman Macedonia, the other victorious nations of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece split these territories among themselves. At this time, no Albanian-language schools or newspapers were allowed in their territories (Durham 2001: 84). Several atrocities also were committed against the Albanians, particularly by the Serbs: massacres and plans to Serbianize the local Albanians so that they would cease speaking "that dirty language" (Durham 1920: 225).

In World War I, states in the region picked sides in order to maximize their gains. During and after the war, there was fighting between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo in particular (Mazower 2000: 117). In response to Italian designs on parts of Slovenia and Croatia, these territories joined Serbia in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This new state absorbed Kosovo and Macedonia as well, without recognizing either territory by name (Drapac 2010: 84). The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had roots in the pan-Slav movement,
and this could be seen in the state's 1929 name change to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. There was even an effort to create a Yugoslav national identity, but this was misleading (Wachtel 1998: 72). The state was Serb-dominated, in both mythos and reality (Drapac 2010: 96-97). It was not intended to be multi-national—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were the only ethnic groups recognized. This left no room for minorities, and in many ways minority groups were pushed to assimilate. Kosovo and Macedonia were viewed as part of South Serbia, and Macedonians in particular were treated as Serbs who spoke an uneducated dialect of the language (Barker 1999: 6).

In the Kingdom, language unity was imposed as a matter of policy (Greenberg 2004: 21-22), marking the beginning of the Albanian sentiment that they were "a non-Slavic people trapped in a Slavic state" (Bakić-Hayden 1995: 925-26). Macedonians and Albanians alike were treated as Serbs, which limited their cultural and language rights (Byron 1979: 68; Franolić 1980: 55; Nećak 1995: 23-24). The Albanian language was not permitted in secular schools. It was permitted in religious ones, however, and mullahs took advantage of this to teach Albanian national identity in them. Another response was to open underground schools, and Albanian students secretly circulated textbooks among themselves. Inter-government communication showed clear signs that the state viewed minorities as a problem to be solved. A memorandum on "The Expulsion of the Albanians" pushed for a violent solution (Nećak 1995: 23), while Turkey and the former Ottoman territories planned population transfers to homogenize the new states. Large numbers of Albanians and Slavic Muslims either fled or assimilated in the interwar period (Bjelajac 2007: 222-26).

All of this happened due to, or perhaps in spite of, post-WWI ideas of self-determination. In theory, any group that held a majority in a sufficiently large region was entitled to autonomy;
thus, Yugoslavia was for the Yugoslav nation. Clearly, that Albanians constituted a majority in some regions of Yugoslavia confirms that self-determination was not a specific goal in creating the Kingdom. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia behaved as though it was formed on the basis of self-determination, seen both in the effort to create a Yugoslav nation and the attempt to assimilate/eliminate large minorities. This also explains why the restriction on language rights only applied to Albanians and Macedonians, but not Germans or Hungarians elsewhere in Yugoslavia (Judah 2008: 44). This reflected the insecurity of the new state—since Macedonian was similar to Bulgarian, the language could not be recognized lest Bulgaria's territorial ambitions be legitimized based on self-determination (Wachtel 1998: 90). Recognition of Albanian created the same problem with Albania.

This period also marked a shift toward defining the call for Albanian autonomy within a framework of rights, using language as a key symbol of identity. This began with the calls for a Greater Albania based on the right to self-determination, but quickly evolved when that became untenable. Following the creation of the League of Nations, the Balkan states were required to sign minority rights treaties, designed to protect the larger minorities within them. These were largely ignored (Mazower 2000: 119-20), as one might expect, given how Yugoslavia ignored the existence of its Albanian and Macedonian minorities. In light of this, it is no surprise that Albanians were rather ambivalent during WWII toward both sides. Under German and Italian influence, they realized Greater Albania and were allowed Albanian-language schools (Judah 2008: 47-48), but it was a puppet state. The Allied Forces may have promised more freedom, but there were no guarantees that Kosovo and Western Macedonia would escape Serbian hegemony (Durham 2001: 187; Hibbert 1999: 185).

4. Language at the Federal Level
After WWII, state boundaries remained as they were during the interwar period. However, the new SFRJ took a drastically different shape. It was conceived of as a multinational federal republic (Hill 2011: 420), in which constituent nations each had a republic. To limit Serbian hegemony, the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were subdivided within Serbia, part of the republic, yet separate. Groups who were minorities within SFRJ but had nation-states elsewhere were classified as nationalities, while other minority groups were labeled as ethnic groups. The term minority was carefully avoided. Once again, the state tried to create a Yugoslav identity; however, this time it was to be a supranational culture, created by ignoring ethnic identities (Wachtel 1998: 9, 131). In a way, there could be unity from the diversity of the state (Nećak-Lük 1995: 115). To achieve this, all forms of nationalism, including linguistic nationalism, were suppressed (Greenberg 2004: 131). This had the effect of suppressing Serbian nationalism at the expense of Albanian and Macedonian self-actualization, which led to resentment from some Serbs (Drapac 2010: 202).

SFRJ acknowledged that as a multinational state, it was multilingual as well (Franolić 1980: 56-57). This was more complicated than it seemed, as the number of languages spoken in the state was not equal to the number of nations in it. Nonetheless, it allowed for minority language rights in the regions where they were spoken. Nećak-Lük explains that while the state based its language policy on who lived within a territory, it at the same time acknowledged the right of individuals to use their mother tongue (Nećak-Lük 1997: 248-50). In many ways, Bugarski (1991) argues that policy focused more on rights than opportunities to use one's language. However, efforts to promote literacy and education among citizens, initially more

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6 As an anonymous reviewer points out, this generalization, while true of most republics, does not hold for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was home to three nations, two of which also had republics: Bosnian Muslims (later Bosniaks), Serbs, and Croats.
successful at the primary and secondary levels than university level (Wachtel 1998: 135),
involved both local languages and Serbo-Croatian.

SFRJ had no official state language (Radovanović 1983: 57); however, Serbo-Croatian
was used as a lingua franca at the federal level (Hill 2011: 420), and all citizens learned it in
school. Serbo-Croatian was only one of the state's official languages, however, and the
languages of each nation (plus Albanian and Hungarian) were constitutionally equal (Bugarski
1991; Škiljan 1991). This was especially true under the 1974 constitution, which enshrined
tolerance for other languages (Greenberg 2004: 164). Institutional support was promised for
minority languages, and at the local level, languages of nationalities were used in media and
education (Bugarski 1991: 20). Support was asymmetrical, however: while speakers of smaller
languages were nearly always bilingual (Kovačec 1991), the majority rarely learned minority
languages, even though two-way bilingualism would have created more contexts in which using
the minority language was appropriate (Byron 1979: 67; Nećak-Lük 1995: 119-20). Although in
general languages of nationalities, especially Albanian, were treated well at the federal level in
SFRJ (see Škiljan 1991), there were tensions regarding language issues as well, with some
arguing that equality under the law did not necessarily translate into equality in practice (Byron
1985: 68). In particular, this may be attributed to a lack of coherence or institutional foundations
for language planning (Bugarski 1991). Because by this point in time language was highly
symbolic of national identity, tensions also centered on national languages (Nećak-Lük 1997:
249-52).

In individual republics, the national language was the official language (Radovanović
1983: 57), but each republic's constitution still allowed for minority language rights, depending
on local demographics and often determined at the district level. Students attended classes in
their local language but also learned the national language (and Serbo-Croatian, when it was not the national language). At this level, tensions over language would be between nations and nationalities—smaller ethnic groups had too few speakers for the republic to effectively serve their needs. At this level, language issues became very local—different republics could have different laws, and so the same nationality could be affected differently depending on where speakers lived (Bugarski 1991: 20-21; Nećak-Lük 1995: 116). Thus, I now discuss three separate cases from 1945 to the present: language policy in Kosovo, South Serbia, and Macedonia separately.

4.1. Kosovo

At the conception of SFRJ, Kosovo was a "region" within Serbia. This gave it limited autonomy, but for the most part, it was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins (Judah 2008: 51). This was in part because in the years immediately after WWII, the government viewed the majority Albanians in Kosovo with suspicion, given their tepid support for the Partisan movement during the war—in fact, fighting between local Albanians and the Partisans continued past the end of the war (Mazower 2000: 124). As such, they were subject to persecution by the state secret police, led by Aleksandar Ranković.

Things began to change in 1959, when the national question re-arose in Kosovo. Tito was instrumental in creating the Non-Aligned Movement, which endorsed self-determination for peoples around the world. There was a clear hypocrisy here—the SFRJ supported local autonomy, except within its own borders (Drapac 2010: 223). In recognition of this, in 1963 Kosovo was made an autonomous province, which brought considerably more local power to the region. The next decade brought an Albanianization of the province and gradual cultural flourishing for Albanians (Judah 2008: 53-54). Political persecution ended with Ranković's
removal in 1966 (Dimitrijević 1995: 50), while student protests in 1968 led to Albanians explicitly receiving the right to display national symbols and use their language (Nećak 1995: 25-26). In 1970, the University of Pristina, formerly a branch of the state university in Belgrade, became a fully-fledged university of its own. Offering Albanian-language courses and programs, it was designed to be SFRJ's university for the Albanian nationality (Judah 2008: 53-54).

In the 1974 Constitution, Albanians received greater recognition and rights. Kosovo remained an autonomous province rather than a republic (Dimitrijević 1995: 57), but was essentially treated the same as other republics. Kosovo had nearly all of the rights of the republics with the exception of secession rights, out of fear that Kosovo Albanians might exercise that right. The Albanian language was co-official with Serbo-Croatian within Kosovo, and received an equal footing with other national languages in some federal institutions as well (Zymeri 1991: 132). For Albanians, the educational system was Albanian first (Byron 1985: 68), although everyone still additionally learned Serbo-Croatian (Judah 2008: 55). The language saw widespread use in mass media and cultural institutions as well (Zymeri 1991: 134). The next few years were the high point for Albanian language rights in Kosovo.

Frustrations mounted during the 1980s, however, sparked by student protests at the university in 1981. While originally about institutional bureaucracy, the tone soon shifted to nationalist themes, with demands for Albanian equality as a nation and republic status for Kosovo (Drapac 2010: 266). From this point, SFRJ and Serbia began efforts to rein in Kosovo's autonomy (Judah 2008: 57-58). This was exacerbated by the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (see Tollefson 2002: 70-71), which hysterically claimed that the Albanian majority was waging cultural genocide against the Serbs in Kosovo (Duijzings 2000:
180). Riding these sentiments, in 1987 Slobodan Milošević began using Serbian nationalist rhetoric in his effort to take control of Serbia and SFRJ. In 1989, the Serbian Parliament voted to reabsorb Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia, and while they remained autonomous provinces, their autonomy was significantly reduced (Drapac 2010: 267). In Kosovo, this was marked by displays of Serbian hegemony, including a decree that only Serbo-Croatian be taught in schools (Nećak-Lük 1995: 120). By 1991, the Albanian language was completely removed from the University of Pristina (International Crisis Group 1998: 4-5). Albanian was disallowed for official use (Greenberg 2004: 164), and Serbian symbols were instituted across the region, including signage in the Cyrillic alphabet (Judah 2008: 73). Friedman (2004) notes that there are few reliable statistics of language use in Kosovo at this time; however, Serbian media was dominant throughout the 1990s, as the only television station broadcast half an hour of Albanian per day and the remainder in Serbian (Zdravković-Zonta 2011: 178).

As SFRJ split into its constituent republics in the 1990s, Kosovo remained part of Serbia. However, in 1991 the Kosovo Parliament unsuccessfully declared independence; this was nullified by the Serbian Parliament and recognized only by Albania. Nevertheless, Kosovars set up a shadow government that ran parallel institutions for the Albanian population (Judah 2008: 69-73). This especially extended to the educational system, as teachers taught Albanians separately using the older Kosovo curriculum. In recent years, Serbs and Albanians have not studied together in Kosovo at the primary or secondary levels (Fridman 2011: 145).

In 1997, some Kosovo Albanians disheartened by the lack of visible progress made through nonviolent efforts began attacking policemen and other Serbian institutions, claiming responsibility as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA was not equipped itself to engage in war against Serbia, but rather hoped to provoke a response from the international
community. This effort succeeded, as in 1998 Serbia began punitive actions in Kosovo, which the United Nations condemned. NATO intervened in 1999, and Serbia lost control over the region.

In a way, NATO ended Serbian persecution, allowing for Albanian persecution of Serbs to begin in the early 2000s (Judah 2008: 154-55). Serbian language and symbols were immediately removed from the public sphere. Streets and statues previously named for Serbian or Communist leaders were renamed for Albanians (Judah 2008: 25). Albanian media expanded quickly, at the expense of disappearing Serbian print media. According to Zdravković-Zonta, it was now the Serb community that was denied the right to use their language. NATO's Kosovo Force, assigned to protect Kosovars, initially did little to protect the now-vulnerable Serbs (p. 172-73). The Albanian parts of Kosovo were essentially a UN protectorate under administration by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), while Serbia still had influence in the Serb-majority region north of the Ibar River. The groups were segregated in the rest of Kosovo, as Serbs retreated to enclaves separate from Albanian-speaking towns. Tensions remained high, peaking with anti-Serbian riots in Mitrovica in March 2004.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo stayed a part of Serbia until it made enough progress to justify revisiting its status (Judah 2008: 109). This was admittedly vague, and after the 2004 riots this framework was revised into the Ahtisaari Plan, which basically called for an independent Kosovo as a multicultural state. The Ahtisaari Plan was rejected by Serbia and Russia, but in 2008 Kosovo declared independence anyway, stating that the new state would implement the Plan (Judah 2008: 115). In theory, the state is founded on civic nationalism rather than ethnic, but this is not necessarily seen in practice. This may be seen in the Law on the Use of Languages of 2006. Albanian and Serbian are designated as official
languages, with specific usage rights within central institutions, courts, public enterprises, education, and state media. While in many respects Kosovo follows the law, the results vary. Serbs and Albanians are still segregated, and public places outside of North Kosovo are dominated by the Albanian language (Fridman 2011: 145). Efforts to integrate the Serbian language into the state are met with frustration—for example, while street signs are bilingual, the Serbian parts are often covered up with graffiti. Documents may be translated, but the translations are of poor quality. This reinforces that while both Serbian and Albanian may be official state languages on paper, knowledge of Albanian is imperative for participation in the public and social life of Kosovo (International Crisis Group 2012: 2-3).

Serbia has exacerbated the problem by not recognizing the state and running parallel institutions in the Serbian enclaves\(^7\). In these, Serb students attend Serbian-funded educational systems, learning a Serbian curriculum in opposition to the Albanian curriculum used by the rest of Kosovo (International Crisis Group 2012: 22-23). The separate education system and other parallel institutions create a language barrier between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, which emphasizes the division between groups. Zymberi (1991) argues that reciprocal bilingualism is necessary to avoid devaluing speakers and their national identities. In the 1980s, this was because Serbs rarely learned Albanian; today, the same could be said in the case of Albanians not learning Serbian. There currently is no bilingual education, to the point that younger Albanians and Serbs use English to communicate. Even older Serbs in the north are unlikely to understand Albanian (International Crisis Group, 2011b: 3-7). This is especially problematic since Albanian has become crucial for participation in society outside of the enclaves, with Serbs

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\(^7\) While talks from 2012 on have led to some agreements (International Crisis Group 2013: i), in many respects the parallel institutions remain.
now a linguistic minority. Only in a few municipalities are Serbian and Albanian treated equally (International Crisis Group 2012: 15).

4.2. Macedonia

The Republic of Macedonia was created as part of SFRJ in 1944. This was remarkable, considering that before this Macedonia was a very fluid concept (Durham 1905: 58). Furthermore, because SFRJ was structured so that only nations had republics, this meant the creation of Macedonia was in effect the recognition of the Macedonian people. Because the nation was so new, it was easiest to define negatively—Macedonians were neither Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, nor Albanians (Troebst 1999: 70). They needed their own language, so the Macedonian language was standardized soon after (Franolić 1980: 60; Greenberg 2004: 8). Previously thought of as a dialect of either Serbo-Croatian or Bulgarian, corpus planners took care to make sure it was neither (Reuter 1999: 30). For a brief period though, the republic was in the position of having a national language used in education and at the federal level, while some uncertainty regarding its linguistic profile persisted.

While in SFRJ, Macedonia treated minority language rights well. Language was explicitly addressed in the republic's 1946 constitution, which gave the right to private and public use of a language. Articles 12 and 72-75 spelled out some of these rights: use in administration, courts, signage, and education (Caca 1999: 150-51). The quality of education and access to it improved as time went on. In the 1950s, Albanian students used their own language, and then learned Macedonian for three hours per week in grades 3-8. Serbo-Croatian was not taught to Albanians at a literary level (Wachtel 1998: 180). As it improved, education began in the local language and introduced Macedonian and Serbo-Croatian later. Albanian students tended to
focus on Serbo-Croatian over Macedonian because it was more useful in career advancement and broader communication within the SFRJ (Greenberg 2004: 164-66).

The 1974 constitution gave more equality to Macedonian at the federal level, but little changed within the republic. In some ways, Macedonian was locally hegemonic—in schools, for example, it was privileged so greatly over Serbo-Croatian that Albanians were not even taught Serbo-Croatian anymore, focusing instead on Macedonian. However, primary and secondary education in Albanian schools was still in Albanian, and the language was given equivalent status to Macedonian in regions with a significant population. This was visibly reflected in public use of signage and scripts for both languages (Caca 1999: 152). The 1980s took a problematic turn though, as Macedonian leadership followed Serbia's lead in Kosovo and implemented repressive policies on Albanian language and culture at the same time that Albanians began agitating for language policy to better adhere to the principles of the 1974 constitution (see Friedman 1993: 82-85). The Albanian language was removed from secondary schools under the justification that Albanian education left Albanians not knowing Macedonian well enough to participate in society (Zymberi 1991: 136-137). Additionally, policies requiring the use of Slavic toponyms (Friedman 1993: 83) and prohibiting ethnic Albanian babies from being given so-called nationalist names were implemented. The latter policy continued until 1992 (International Crisis Group 1998: 2).

Macedonia was not immune to the nationalist tensions that flared up as the SFRJ fell apart. Some of this was a push against the repressive policies of the 1980s—Albanian students refused to accept their diplomas during the 1989-90 school year, as they were presented in Macedonian. By this point, Albanian-language education had been restricted to the elementary level only (Reuter 1999: 36-37). The 1990 parliamentary elections appeared to be a positive
step, as for the first and only time in SFRJ's history, both ethnic and civic parties won seats (Mirčev 1999: 205-06). This was perhaps misleading. Immediately after declaring independence in 1991, the Macedonian government removed Serbo-Croatian from the national curriculum (Greenberg 2004: 164-66).

Independent Macedonia was conceived of first and foremost as a nation-state. This was seen clearly in its constitution, which paid lip service to minority rights while emphasizing "the historical fact that Macedonia is constituted as the national state of the Macedonian people." Although minority groups were given the right to use their language in Article 7, the same article explicitly defined Macedonian as the official language of the state, and Cyrillic as the official alphabet. Likewise, Articles 45 and 48 allowed for minority languages to be used in the educational system, but also asserted that Macedonian would be taught (International Crisis Group 1998: 24-25). Minority language rights did not mean a multilingual society was the goal; there was clear pressure to assimilate in order to participate in the state or get jobs (Caca 1999: 157). The protection of minority language rights in the constitution was less a gesture of goodwill than the need to comply with the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Caca 1999: 148-49). Because Macedonia did not accept diplomas from the University of Pristina, there was no Albanian-language higher education, and declining numbers of qualified Albanian-speaking teachers (Pettifer, 1999a: 142).

Macedonia's leaders feared that its non-Albanian Muslim population would assimilate not to the majority group, but to the predominantly Muslim Albanian group (Poulton 1999: 114-20). They also feared that Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece would tear the state apart in a land grab (Pettifer, 1999b: 17). These fears dictated language policies from the beginning of the
state's existence, as well as the state's response when tensions over language inevitably rose. Albanians were upset that the lingua communis of the state had changed from Serbo-Croatian to Macedonian, and pushed for national status co-equal with Macedonian within the state (Greenberg 2004: 164-66). Albanian efforts centered around the creation of an Albanian-language university and more representation in the media. This request was met to a degree in the media (International Crisis Group 1998: 9), but because the state feared Albanian rights would undermine the Macedonian nation, the requests regarding education were refused. Despite this refusal, Albanian activists started a university in Tetovo in 1995. This was quickly declared illegal by the state, and attempts were made to shut it down (International Crisis Group 1998: 4-5). Even though it was illegal and unrecognized, the University of Tetovo had 4,000 students in 1998 (International Crisis Group, 2000: 18-20; Pettifer, 1999a: 142).

In many ways, the University of Tetovo was serving as a proxy for other issues (Friedman 2004: 201). These came to a head in 2001, when there was a brief conflict between the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and the state. This came to an end when both sides signed the Ohrid Agreement, which provided a blueprint for better incorporating Albanians into the Macedonian state (International Crisis Group, 2011a: 1). Most of the agreement came about easily, but language proved to be one of the final sticking points, only solved by compromise phrasings discussing the "citizens" of Macedonia (Greenberg 2004: 164-66). Albanians wanted their language to be a second official language of Macedonia, but the government insisted that this could not happen, arguing that it would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Instead, the Albanian language holds that status only in areas like Western Macedonia that have a large Albanian population. The parts of the constitution that were egregiously anti-minority were changed. However, the laws providing for minority
language rights were only passed in 2008, solely affecting municipalities with an Albanian population of 20% or more. Even so, there have been complaints that Macedonian mayors refuse to implement the law (International Crisis Group, 2011a: 14-17). As a result, the capital of Skopje still appears to be a monolingual city in signage. In cities like this, there is a visible sense of segregation.

The Ohrid Agreement provided for greatly expanded minority language rights. The educational system now provides full elementary and secondary education not only in Macedonian and Albanian, but in Serbian and Turkish as well. This is a positive development, but at the same time it means students are kept segregated because they do not speak each other's languages. All students still learn Macedonian, but families have the right to decide when they begin, following a 2010 Supreme Court ruling in which Albanians successfully argued that any imposed curriculum of another language violated their language rights. Higher education in Albanian became available and state-sanctioned under the Ohrid framework as well. To avoid the embarrassment of recognizing the University of Tetovo, the government instead founded Tetovo State University in the same city, which offers a curriculum that includes Albanian and English instruction (International Crisis Group, 2011a: 17). Since 2001, Macedonia has been mostly peaceful. There are still occasional clashes along ethnic lines—most recently in 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2011a: 14) and 2013—but they are more or less contained.

4.3. Serbia

Zymerbi (1991) suggests that during the SFRJ years, in Serbia proper the Albanian population was small enough that expecting the same conditions for Albanian language use as in Kosovo or Macedonia would be unrealistic (p. 137). In the Preševo Valley, however, three municipalities have a large Albanian population—95% in Preševo, 65% in Bujanovac, and 35%
in Medveđa (International Crisis Group 2001: 2). The area was historically considered part of Kosovo, but in 1959 Serbia redrew the borders to insert the Serbian population in North Kosovo and keep the valley for itself (Judah 2008: 5). This was for strategic purposes—SFRJ's main rail line ran through Preševo, and plans for a East-Central European highway include it in the route (International Crisis Group 2001: 2).

Like the other SFRJ republics, Serbia allowed for minority education. Because Kosovo was still a part of Serbia, the republic used the Kosovo curriculum for Albanians in the valley. Thus, their fortunes largely depended on the fortunes of those in Kosovo. As Serbia began repressing Kosovo, it began repressing Albanians in the Preševo Valley as well—for example, the Kosovo curriculum was removed in 1982, and language and cultural rights were scaled back from 1983 through the 1990s (International Crisis Group 2003: 21).

Even as part of the rump Yugoslavia, the situation in the Preševo Valley changed greatly as SFRJ disintegrated. In 1992, local Albanians held a referendum in which a majority voted to join Kosovo (International Crisis Group 2003: 1), which by this point had itself unsuccessfully declared independence. No one actually expected that Serbia would permit this, but it still had the effect of proving the impending threat of irredentists forming a Greater Albania to those who sought evidence of it (International Crisis Group 2003: 10). In 2001 the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medveđa (UCPMB) attempted to begin a separatist conflict in the demilitarized zone along the border with Kosovo. Cooler heads prevailed, however, and Serbia sought a peaceful means to end the conflict. NATO sided with Serbia, and the conflict was resolved more through diplomacy and negotiations than violence. By and large, the local people did not support the UCPMB during the conflict (International Crisis Group 2001: ii-4).
The conflict ended with both sides signing the Čović Plan, which provided a detailed guide for the Serbian government to improve its treatment of the Albanians. At first, local Albanians viewed it as treasonous to participate, but they eventually came around (International Crisis Group 2007: 8). The Čović Plan included several features of language policy, including a new Law on National Minorities, which made languages official in municipalities where 15% or more of the population spoke them. After it was passed in 2002, this made Albanian an official language in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medveda. Considerable effort was made to improve Albanian-language media as well; however, while it is now present in Bujanovac and Preševo, the reporting is of low quality. In an outreach effort, 4,800 Albanian-language books were purchased for the Preševo public library (International Crisis Group 2003: 21).

Schools had previously faced the same problem as in Macedonia: Serbia stopped recognizing diplomas from the University of Pristina. This drastically reduced the number of qualified Albanian teachers, especially when Serbia instituted a requirement that teachers carry four-year degrees, rather than two-year (International Crisis Group 2001: 13). This was problematic, as the majority of students in the region were Albanian (International Crisis Group 2007: 3). Under the Čović Plan, diplomas from the Kosovo Albanian parallel institution in Pristina were accepted as long as they carried a stamp of approval from UNMIK, which certified that the recipient had passed an external exam on their field. Furthermore, in 2006 Serbia announced plans to open a new high school and a teachers' college in Bujanovac. Until it opened, its potential students were studying in Kosovo, Albania, or Macedonia (International Crisis Group 2007: 14). This change allowed schools to improve, although their textbooks were
of poor quality even several years later. As in Macedonia, schools in the Preševo Valley are segregated by language (International Crisis Group 2003: 21).

The Ćović Plan has, for the most part, kept the peace in South Serbia, and has been considered "one of the rare conflict resolution success stories in the former Yugoslavia." It has not been perfect; many rural villages emptied by violence are still empty (International Crisis Group 2007: i-2). There have also been sporadic incidents in the last decade. For example, in 2003 a group calling itself the Albanian National Army tried sparking violent conflict, however, they received no support from the local population (International Crisis Group 2003: i). In addition, there is still a perception of Serbian bias toward Albanians (International Crisis Group 2007: 3-5). Albanians have continued pushing for expanded language rights, like bilingual identity cards—currently, the label is bilingual but the content is entirely in Serbian (International Crisis Group 2007: 14). Overall though, a naive visitor to the Preševo Valley would not realize there had been a recent conflict (International Crisis Group 2007: 1-2).

5. What Can We Learn?

As things stand, there are four potential routes for language policy in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia to pursue⁸:

1. All minorities assimilate to the national language. This comes with a loss of heritage and identity, but potentially increased social cohesion and mobility.

2. All minorities remain separate, with their own institutions. This preserves tradition and identity, at the expense of segregation.

3. All minorities are neglected. This marginalizes each minority equally.

4. Balanced bilingualism for both majority and minority groups.

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⁸ Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for assistance in clarifying these possibilities.
In the above case studies, routes (1) and (3) are immediately untenable, and route (2) would only provide a temporary fix. I suggest route (4) is in fact the necessary, albeit idealistic, solution.

Skutnabb-Kangas (2001) argues that when a state does not grant minority linguistic rights, ethnic conflicts often arise in response (p. 204). In these case studies, we have seen exactly that: policies of assimilation or neglect (routes 1 and 3), whether in education, media, or elsewhere, have gone hand-in-hand with ethnic conflicts. This is because in the 1980s in particular, language policies took a turn from promoting a multinational state to promoting structural violence toward minorities. These policies were designed to protect individual republic's territorial integrity and assert power and control over the minority population (Skutnabb-Kangas 1997: 312). These were accompanied by other instances of physical and structural violence as well, but as language is ubiquitous in everyday life, these policies are clear-cut examples. It is no wonder that minority groupness crystallized in each of these regions in response to violent language policies. Furthermore, these case studies show that negative peace—the absence of war—is not enough to end conflict in these regions; there also needs to be positive peace—an absence of structural violence (Galtung 1969). Previous policies need to be acknowledged and righted in order to for there to be peace.

Because of this, justice was and is a key part of resolving these conflicts. Aside from punishing perpetrators of war crimes, this involves undoing the structural violence that helped instigate the situation. As such, policies ensuring positive language rights are necessary. Whether or not this was an explicit goal, the Ahtisaari Plan, Ohrid Agreement, and Ćović Plan all work to address it, with varying degrees of success. This is why each plan involves concessions on language rights: creating policies that avoid future injustices is a key aspect of promoting justice (Kriesberg 2004: 100). This occurred even in cases where the separatist group
was ultimately unsuccessful, because social justice should not depend on majority rule (Williams 1997: 433). However, this also illustrates the difficulty in eliminating unjust practices: there is a fine line between undoing an unjust situation and creating one in the opposite direction (Kriesberg 2004: 83-84). While Macedonia and Serbia have stayed on the right side of this line, Kosovo has failed. Its odd situation has contributed—here more than anywhere else, "a majority in one period became a minority in another and vice versa" (Nećak-Lük 1995: 114). While part of Serbia, it swung from Serb-dominated to Albanian-dominated and back again. Now that it is independent, the pendulum has swung again toward Albanian hegemony, despite the stated goal of a multicultural state. Practices of language policy have reflected these shifts, and today Serbs are in a position of language discrimination similar to what Albanians were in just fifteen years ago. Given the state's history of correcting injustice with injustice, it is no surprise that of the three conflicts discussed, the one in Kosovo is the most intractable.

However, even solutions that avoid creating new unjust situations encounter a major problem: the segregation of majority and minority populations, particularly in the educational system (route 2). Scarry writes that in order to solve the problem of imagining the Other, we must eliminate the structure of "foreignness" (p. 40). While the segregation of schools and communities solves immediate problems, it nonetheless creates and rigidifies such a structure. However, segregation has been offered as a solution for decades now. Edith Durham argued in letters that partitioning land was the only path to peace (Durham 2001: 217-18), and currently partition is often proposed as a fix in Kosovo. But even as partition and segregation keep the foreign element away from the majority, they still maintain the foreign element as foreign, maintaining the possibility of future conflict. Within the Preševo Valley, Serbia has done a

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9 After the Serbia and Kosovo agreed to normalize relations in the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo (Barlovac 2013), this appears to have been taken off the table as an option. Implementation of the agreement is still up in the air in many respects, however.
better job of integration of Albanians—for example, integrating its local police in the Preševo Valley immediately after the 2001 conflict—than Macedonia, and Serbia has had fewer incidents than Macedonia in the years since. This is not a coincidence.

A need for integration means that positive language rights for Albanian speakers cannot come at the expense of other populations. Skutnabb-Kangas (2001) argues that linguistic and educational rights are necessary for conflict prevention (p. 204), but here, they are necessary for conflict resolution as well. Balanced bilingualism, previously advocated by Zymberi (1991) for Albanians and Serbs alike in Serbia and Kosovo, and Albanians and Macedonians alike in Macedonia (route 4) is not only an appealing possibility, but a necessary solution. This is easier said than done; multilingualism does not fit a nationalist agenda (Heller 2008). The symbolic link between language and power means a change in language status represents a change in power relations, making shift to positive language rights and balanced bilingualism quite difficult (Wright 2007). However, this is perhaps precisely why such a shift is necessary: it would be highly symbolic of the change in power relations that needs to happen.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I explore three case studies in oppressive language policy in the former SFRJ. Since language policy can be a glaring example of structural violence within a state, ethnic conflicts often emerge either over language rights or with language as a key symbolic issue. In the case of the former SFRJ, this situation plays out in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia, and discriminatory language policies served as both indicator of a potential conflict and the eventual cause. Even as conflict was of a similar nature in each state—it erupted over treatment of the same ethnic group by local Slavs, and Macedonia followed the Serbian example in creating a nation-state—we can see that addressing language policies differently in each region
led to different outcomes. Kosovo remains intractable in part because of its current policies of linguistic discrimination against Serbs, while Macedonia and Serbia have been relatively peaceful and stable since making corrections that lessen the degree of structural violence. Improved language policies, then, have served as conflict resolution tools and could serve as such in Kosovo as well. The promotion of positive language rights and balanced bilingualism for all groups, particularly in education, would improve the situation greatly (in each state, but particularly Kosovo). In some ways, this would put the Balkan states on par with the English-French dynamic in Canada. At this stage, that might not be so bad.
References


Law on the Use of Languages of 2006, Kosovo L. 02/L-37.


