Financial Crises and Macro-Finance Policy

‘What Happened: Financial Factors in the Great Recession,’ Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S., 2018.

Since the onset of the Great Recession, an explosion of both theoretical and empirical research has investigated how the financial crisis emerged and how it was transmitted to the real sector. The goal of this paper is to describe what we have learned from this new research and how it can be used to understand what happened during the Great Recession. In the process, we also present some new evidence on the role of the household balance sheet channel versus the disruption of banking. We examine a panel of quarterly state level data on house prices, mortgage debt and employment along with a measure of banking distress. Then exploiting both panel data and time series methods, we analyze the contribution of the house price decline versus the banking distress indicator to the overall decline in employment during the Great Recession. We confirm a common finding in the literature that the household balance sheet channel is important for regional variation in employment. However, we also find that the disruption in banking was central to the overall employment contraction.

‘A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics,’ Gertler, M. (with N. Kiyotaki, and A. Prestipino), 2017.

This paper incorporates banks and banking panics within a conventional macroeconomic framework to analyze the dynamics of a Önancial crisis of the kind recently experienced. We are particularly interested in characterizing the sudden and discrete nature of the banking panics as well as the circumstances that makes an economy vulnerable to such panics in some instances but not in others. Having a conventional macroeconomic model allows us to study the channels by which the crisis affects real activity and the effects of policies in containing crises.

‘Illiquidity and Under-Valuation of Firms,’ Gale, D. (with P. Gottardi), 2010.

We study a competitive model in which debt-financed firms may default in some states of nature. Incomplete markets prevent firms from hedging the risk of asset firesales when markets are illiquid. This is the only friction in the model and the only cost of default. The anticipation of such losses alone may distort firms’ investment decisions. We characterize the conditions under which competitive equilibria are inefficient and the form the inefficiency takes. We also show that endogenous financial crises may arise as a result of pure sunspot events. Finally, we examine alternative interventions to restore the efficiency of equilibria.

‘Household Leverage and the Recession,’ Midrigan, V. (with T. Philippon, and J. Callum ), 2018.

We evaluate and partially challenge the ‘household leverage’ view of the Great Recession. In the data, employment and consumption declined more in states where household debt declined more. We study a model where liquidity constraints amplify the response of consumption and employment to changes in debt. We estimate the model with Bayesian methods combining state and aggregate data. Changes in household credit limits explain 40% of the differential rise and fall of employment across states, but a small fraction of the aggregate employment decline in 2008-2010. Nevertheless, since household deleveraging was gradual, credit shocks greatly slowed the recovery.

‘Model Secrecy and Stress Tests,’ Williams, B., (with Y. Leitner), 2018.

Conventional wisdom holds that the models used to stress test banks should be kept secret to prevent gaming. We show instead that secrecy can be suboptimal, because although it deters gaming, it may also deter socially desirable investment. When the regulator can choose the minimum standard for passing the test, we show that secrecy is suboptimal if the regulator is sufficiently uncertain regarding bank characteristics. When failing the bank is socially costly, then under some conditions, secrecy is suboptimal when the bank’s private cost of failure is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. Finally, we relate our results to several current and proposed stress testing policies.

‘Stress Tests and Bank Portfolio Choice,’ Williams, B., 2017.

How informative should bank stress tests be? I use Bayesian persuasion to formalize stress tests and show that regulators can reduce the likelihood of a bank run by performing tests which are only partially informative. Optimal stress tests give just enough failing grades to keep passing grades credible enough to avoid runs. The worse the state of the banking system, the more stringent stress tests must be to prevent runs. I find that optimal stress tests, by reducing the probability of runs, reduce the optimal level of banks’ liquidity cushions. I also examine the impact of anticipated stress tests on banks’ ex ante incentive to invest in risky versus safe assets.