September 25, 2017 – 6:00 p.m. NYU School of Law: Program on Corporate Compliance & Enforcement / Institute for Corporate Governance & Finance As Prepared for Delivery
Thank you for that introduction. I’m happy to be here with you all today. I want to talk today about some of our priorities for the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement, and in particular about our cooperation and self-reporting program. In just a minute, I’ll talk in some detail about this program. But to frame that discussion, I want to start by talking more generally about our mission in the CFTC and the Division of Enforcement, and some of our priorities going forward. As I get started, please keep in mind that these are my own views and not necessarily those of the Commission or its staff.
CFTC Mission and Division of Enforcement
At the CFTC, our mission is to foster open, transparent, competitive and financially sound markets. A vigorous enforcement program is essential to fulfilling this mission. As Chairman Giancarlo has made clear, under his leadership, there will be no pause, no let up, and no relaxation in the CFTC’s efforts to enforce the law and punish wrongdoing.Continue reading →
On August 8, 2017, the United Kingdom (“UK”) broadened the obligation to report known or suspected financial sanctions breaches to apply to a range of professional service providers and certain businesses, including lawyers, external accountants and auditors. This reporting obligation reflects a wider trend of the UK government taking a more proactive approach to enforcing sanctions compliance.
This reporting obligation is now similar in scope to the money laundering reporting obligations, as imposed by the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017.
As well as impacting the internal compliance policies of professional services firms operating in the UK, this new obligation may also impact the dealings of their clients, particularly in a mergers and acquisitions context. It is also likely to significantly increase the number of reports made to the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (“OFSI”). Continue reading →
We are now almost one year in since the DOJ announced with much fanfare its repackaged approach to corporate cooperation in the Yates memo in September 2015, followed months later with the much-ballyhooed release of the FCPA Pilot Program in April 2016. These highly publicized pronouncements reinforced the perception of DOJ’s focus on proactive corporate cooperation and voluntary disclosure with the enticement of the alleged benefits for companies. At the same time, DOJ clearly has been engaged in a deliberate effort to tout the apparent benefits of corporate cooperation with its very public announcements in spring/summer 2016 of declinations of prosecutions in some circumstances (for example, Akamai, Johnson Controls and Nortek) and reduced penalties in other cases (such as Analogic/BK Medical), citing voluntary disclosures and cooperation as one of the primary reasons for leniency. Continue reading →
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recently launched a new pilot program designed to encourage more corporations to voluntarily report their own violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), but the program does not go far enough to achieve its goals.
The pilot program is the first time that the DOJ has offered specific benefits to corporations that self-report that are unavailable to firms that fail to disclose detected wrongdoing and cooperate only when caught. This is an important reform. Yet closer examination reveals that the benefits detailed in the pilot program are not sufficient to lead corporations to disclose significant wrongdoing that will otherwise likely remain hidden. Continue reading →