Category Archives: Corporate Criminal Liability

DOJ Calls Foul On Duplicative Corporate Penalties

by Pablo Quiñones

Corporate misconduct allegations often result in investigations by multiple agencies, including foreign, federal, state, and local authorities.  Without proper coordination, companies risk being hit with duplicative penalties for the same misconduct.  Duplicative corporate penalties can be avoided, but coordinating a corporate resolution with multiple authorities is hard to navigate. 

Within the United States, federal prosecutors often have overlapping jurisdiction with other federal criminal and civil prosecutors, federal and state regulators, and local prosecutors.  In international investigations, federal prosecutors also have to cooperate with foreign authorities with overlapping jurisdiction.  All of these players can have a legitimate interest in protecting the public from economic crimes.  Regulatory competition, however, often leads government authorities to want to take the lead over other authorities.   Other times, government authorities jump from the sidelines onto the field of play when a corporate resolution is near and refuse to leave the field without a share of the penalties.  A coordinated resolution is difficult to achieve in either case.  In the end, the overlapping jurisdiction and regulatory competition can either lead to (1) each authority “piling on” their share of penalties or (2) a coordinated resolution that identifies the collective harm caused by the company’s misconduct, the appropriate penalties for that harm, and the fair allocation of the penalties among the interested government players. Continue reading

Extending the “Failure to Prevent” Model of Corporate Criminal Liability in the UK

by Liz Campbell

Prosecuting corporate criminality is not straightforward. As a result of these difficulties, the UK Parliament is turning to an indirect form of corporate criminal liability: the Bribery Act 2010 introduced the corporate offence of failure to prevent bribery (FtPB), and this provision has been emulated with respect to the failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion in the Criminal Finances Act 2017.  

In brief, a relevant commercial organisation (C) is guilty of FtPB if a person associated with C bribes another person with the intention of obtaining or retaining business or an advantage for C.  An ‘associated’ person is an individual or body who ‘performs services’ for or on behalf of the organisation, and this definition was framed broadly intentionally.[1]  Crucially, the corporate entity can rely on the section 7(2) defence that it had “adequate procedures” in place designed to prevent persons associated with it from bribing. Continue reading

Supreme Court Hears Argument to Determine Whether Mandatory Federal Restitution Statute Covers Professional Costs Incurred by Corporate Victims

by Joon H. Kim, Rahul Mukhi, Rusty Feldman, and Samantha Del Duca

On April 18, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Lagos v. United States.[1]  On appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Lagos presents the important issue of whether a corporate victim’s professional costs—such as investigatory and legal expenses—incurred as a result of a criminal defendant’s offense conduct must be reimbursed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”).[2] 

The issue has been subject to a recurring circuit split and Lagos now offers the Supreme Court an opportunity to resolve the conflict.[3]  Moreover, as noted by the certiorari petition, the Court’s decision will necessarily have implications “every time corporations engage in internal investigations or audits at the suspicion of wrongdoing.”[4]  Continue reading

Repeat Corporate Misconduct

by Veronica Root

But for other more salacious political concerns, the biggest story of the last couple weeks likely would have been Mark Zuckerberg’s testimony before Congress.  Zuckerberg spent two days answering hundreds of questions from lawmakers.[1]  Much of the questioning was concerned with Facebook’s protection, or alleged lack thereof, of its users’ privacy.  The testimony, however, once again raises questions about how companies that engage in repeated instances of misconduct should be sanctioned. Continue reading

The Rule of Law and the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine after Quality Egg

by Jason Driscoll
This post is the second part of a two-part post by the author.

Introduction

In my previous post (DeCoster v. United States: Testing the Limits of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine), I discussed how the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have revived the Responsible Corporate Officer (“RCO”) doctrine in an attempt to increase compliance with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). In light of the incarcerative sentences in the Quality Egg case, I addressed the DOJ’s new strategy of seeking enhanced sanctions in RCO cases. In United States v. Quality Egg, LLC,[1] the government brought FDCA Section 333(a)(1) misdemeanor food adulteration cases against two corporate officers—Jack and Peter DeCoster—ultimately securing three-month prison sentences premised largely on the RCO doctrine.[2] On appeal, the DeCosters argued that the incarcerative sentences violated due process absent evidence of mens rea or actus reus.[3] The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentences, however, holding that a three-month strict liability prison sentence was “relatively light” doing “no grave damage” to an offender’s reputation.[4] A petition for a writ of certiorari followed, inviting the Supreme Court to review the doctrine for the first time since 1975, but was denied. Continue reading

Singapore Introduces Deferred Prosecution Agreements

by Zachary S. Brez, Brigham Q. Cannon, Mark Filip, Asheesh Goel, Cori A. Lable, Kim B. Nemirow, Abdus Samad Pardesi, Richard Sharpe, William J. Stuckwisch, Marcus Thompson, Satnam Tumani, and Jodi Wu

On 19 March 2018, Singapore passed legislation introducing the concept of the deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) to the jurisdiction for the first time. Under the new laws, corporations (but not individuals) facing prosecution for offences of corruption, money laundering or receipt of stolen property may attempt to negotiate the terms of a DPA with prosecuting authorities, under which they would avoid prosecution, in return for adherence to various conditions imposed upon them, for a set period of time.

By introducing the DPA as an enforcement tool, Singapore joins the ranks of the United States[1], Brazil[2], the United Kingdom[3] and France,[4] which form the vanguard of an increasingly consistent global approach to corporate criminal resolutions. Australia and Canada are also both currently evaluating whether to introduce similar legislation. Continue reading

The Clash of Legal Cultures in the Brave New World of International Law Enforcement

by Peter B. Pope, Nancy C. Jacobson, and Kelly Hagedorn

Defense lawyers all around the world have heard loud and clear that prosecutors and police agencies have announced a new age of international cooperation.  Prosecutors from one country have been posted to the offices of another.  Agents from nations around the world now sit at desks next to each other in central locations like London.  Global resolutions of big cases are being announced by enforcers in multiple jurisdictions.  One of the main subject-matter focuses of these joint cases has been anti-corruption – namely the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States and the Bribery Act in the United Kingdom. Continue reading

The Jury is Out on Compliance in the First Test of the Bribery Act’s Adequate Procedures Defence

by Omar Qureshi, Iskander Fernandez, and Amy Wilkinson

Last month saw the first contested prosecution of a corporation for failure to prevent bribery under section 7 of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 (the “Bribery Act”), providing the first insights into how such a case may be argued and determined.  The defendant company Skansen Interiors Limited (“SIL”) was found guilty of failing to prevent bribery by one of its employees, who paid £10,000 (and offered, and tried to secure payment of a further £29,000) to another in order to secure two contracts for SIL.  The individuals involved had already pleaded guilty to substantive bribery offences.

A jury found SIL did not have adequate procedures designed to prevent bribery.  While the judge did not give her views on what may constitute adequate procedures and why SIL’s fell short, the jury’s verdict indicates that even small companies may need to have documented and targeted procedures in place, specifically addressing bribery prevention, if they are to succeed in proving an adequate procedures defence. Continue reading

DOJ Applies Principles of FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy in Other White-Collar Investigations, Increasing Opportunity for Corporate Declinations

by John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene, Wayne M. Carlin, David B. Anders, Marshall L. Miller, and Jonathan Siegel

Late last week, the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division announced at an ABA white-collar conference that it has begun using the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy as “nonbinding guidance” in other areas of white-collar enforcement beyond the FCPA.  As a result, absent aggravating factors, DOJ may more frequently decline to prosecute companies that promptly self-disclose misconduct, fully cooperate with DOJ’s investigation, remediate in a complete and timely fashion, and disgorge any ill-gotten gains.  As a first example of this approach, the officials pointed to DOJ’s recent decision to decline charges against Barclays PLC, after the bank agreed to pay back $12.9 million in wrongful profits, following individual charges arising out of a foreign exchange front-running scheme. Continue reading

English Litigation Privilege in Internal Investigations: Not Quite Dead Yet?

by Kelly Hagedorn

Following the decisions in The RBS Rights Issue Litigation[1] and Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Limited[2] (“ENRC”), it was thought that the prospect of claiming legal professional privilege in English proceedings over interview memoranda generated during internal investigations was slim (see our client alert on those two cases here).  However, a recent decision of the English High Court in Bilta (UK) Limited and Others v (1) Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (2) Mercuria Energy Europe Trading Limited[3] (“Bilta”) has refused the disclosure of interview memoranda on the basis of litigation privilege, providing a glimmer of hope for corporates who seek to protect such documents from disclosure. Continue reading