Category Archives: Bribery

Section 7 of the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 and the “Fair Warning Principle”

by Jonathan J. Rusch

As governments around the world watch the rising tide of public sentiment and law enforcement actions against corruption,[1] some are looking to the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 (the “Act”) as a model for crafting their own criminal sanctions, including with regard to corporate criminal liability.[2]  Section 7 of the Act, which is captioned, “Failure of commercial organization to prevent bribery,” defines the offense in just 45 words:

A relevant commercial organisation (“C”) is guilty of an offence under this section if a person (“A”) associated with C bribes another person intending—

(a) to obtain or retain business for C, or

(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for C.[3]

Unless the company, as an affirmative defense, can “prove that [it] had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with [it] from undertaking such conduct,”[4] it faces a criminal fine without statutory limit.[5] Continue reading

Global Anti-Bribery Year-in-Review: 2017 Developments and Predictions for 2018

by Kimberly A. Parker, Jay Holtmeier, Erin G.H. Sloane, Lillian Howard Potter, Tetyana V. Gaponenko, Victoria J. Lee, and Roger M. Witten

This past year marked the 40th anniversary of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).  Since its enactment in 1977, the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) has brought approximately 300 FCPA enforcement actions, while the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has brought approximately 200 cases.[1]  This anniversary year, the first year of the Trump administration, demonstrated that the FCPA continues to be a powerful tool in combating corruption abroad and encouraging compliance at global companies.

Below are six key take-aways regarding FCPA enforcement in 2017: Continue reading

Global Magnitsky Sanctions Target Human Rights Abusers and Government Corruption Around the World

by David S. Cohen, Kimberly A. Parker, Jay Holtmeier, Ronald I. Meltzer, David M. Horn, Lillian Howard Potter, and Michael Romais

On December 20, 2017, President Trump issued a new Executive Order (EO) targeting corruption and human rights abuses around the world.

The EO implements last year’s Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (the Global Magnitsky Act), which authorized the president to impose sanctions against human rights abusers and those who facilitate government corruption.[1] The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which will administer the EO, also added 15 individuals and 37 entities to its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). Continue reading

DOJ Expands and Codifies Policy Incentivizing Corporations to Voluntarily Self-Disclose FCPA Violations

by Eric Volkman, Erin Brown Jones, and Bridget R. Reineking

On November 29, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein announced that the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has implemented a permanent, revised version of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Pilot Program.[1] The Pilot Program — which was launched as a one-year trial in April 2016 by then-Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division (and now Latham partner) Leslie Caldwell — was extended indefinitely in April 2017 to allow DOJ to evaluate the program’s efficacy.[2] Rosenstein announced that the enhanced policy — now called the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (FCPA Policy) — will be incorporated into the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM). Like its predecessor, the FCPA Policy aims to encourage companies to make timely and voluntary disclosures of wrongdoing under the FCPA, while providing additional concrete incentives rewarding corporations for cooperation.

This policy announcement is likely the first of several DOJ policy changes and/or enhancements under the new administration. As detailed in Latham’s October 2017 Client Alert, Rosenstein recently announced that DOJ was reviewing a wide range of existing corporate enforcement policies, including the Pilot Program, DOJ’s policy on “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing” (the Yates Memo), and other DOJ policies and memoranda — with the intention of ultimately incorporating the revised policies into the USAM. Continue reading

Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the SEC’s Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

New York University School of Law, New York, NY

Nov. 9, 2017

Good afternoon, and thank you for inviting me to speak today. Before I begin, let me give the required disclaimer that the views I express here today are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or its staff.[1]

I am honored to be here to mark with you the 40th anniversary of the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the 20th year of the OECD anti-bribery convention. I want to thank New York University’s Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement for hosting this event. Programs like this one provide important forums for dialogue on critical enforcement issues, and I am pleased that this gathering has assembled so many familiar and distinguished practitioners in FCPA enforcement, our colleagues in domestic and international law enforcement, and academics who are interested in this space. Collaboration and coordination is integral to the Division of Enforcement’s efforts to combat bribery through the enforcement of the FCPA, and the OECD has played a pivotal role in fostering global efforts against bribery and corruption.

Continue reading

Russia Considers Enhanced Whistleblower Protections

by Jane Shvets, Anna V. Maximenko, and Elena Klutchareva

Effective anti-corruption compliance programs include protections for whistleblowers that raise corruption concerns.  Article 13.3 of Russia‘s 2008 Federal Law No. 273-FZ on Counteracting Corruption (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) addressed Russian lawmakers’ expectations regarding effective compliance programs.[1]  But the law was silent on whistleblower protections.  Recently proposed legislation in Russia may help address this gap.

Even before the Anti-Corruption Law came into effect, Russian law included several provisions that could be interpreted to provide some protection for whistleblowers.  For example, Russian employment law prohibits discrimination and sets out an exhaustive list of permissible grounds for dismissing an employee for cause; firing an employee for blowing the whistle on potential corruption is not among them.  As a result, firing an employee for whistleblowing could ran afoul of Russian employment law.  In addition, the Russian government can protect individuals whose security might be threatened as a result of their participation in criminal proceedings that involve alleged corruption.  The state might, for example, provide such witnesses with physical protection, relocate them, or even give them new identities. Continue reading

Keeping Score of FIFA’s Corruption, Compliance and Efforts for Reform – Part 2

by Brandon D. Fox

Part 2 – Changing the Game Plan

In late June, FIFA, the world’s governing soccer organization, released the “Garcia Report,” chronicling the extensive corruption and conflicts of interest that occurred in FIFA’s awarding of the men’s 2018 and 2022 World Cup venues. Part 1 summarized the report’s findings. Part 2 discusses how specific steps and safeguards can mitigate the risks of misconduct and ensure cooperation among FIFA officials – and at any organization.

Leadership

FIFA’s problems started at the top.  FIFA’s investigators found an astounding number of executive committee members committed misconduct and showed disdain for the investigation.  FIFA’s failures were systemic and reflected a culture of corruption.  An organization’s culture cannot be fixed simply by strengthening rules or creating a targeted compliance program.  Indeed, these are meaningless if the leaders themselves are corrupt.  Executives must have integrity and show a commitment to everyone’s compliance with the law.  FIFA needs to identify candidates for its executive committee that have shown integrity and a dedication to complying with rules and laws. Continue reading

Keeping Score of FIFA’s Corruption, Compliance and Efforts for Reform – Part 1

by Brandon D. Fox

Part 1 – Foul Play

The first installment of this two-part series summarizes the Garcia Report’s findings of misconduct. Author Brandon Fox also focuses on the difficulties investigators faced as a result of leaders failing to cooperate and contrasts the misconduct and lack of cooperation to the U.S. Soccer Federation’s behavior.

In late June, FIFA, the world’s governing soccer organization, released the Garcia Report chronicling the extensive corruption and conflicts of interest that occurred in FIFA’s awarding of the men’s 2018 and 2022 World Cup venues.  This article summarizes the Garcia Report’s findings of misconduct, focusing on the difficulties investigators faced as a result of leaders failing to cooperate, and discusses how specific steps and safeguards can mitigate the risks of misconduct and ensure cooperation among FIFA officials – and at any organization. Continue reading

Foreign Bribery: Incentives and Enforcement

by Jonathan Karpoff, Scott Lee, and Gerald Martin

Managers caught bribing foreign officials enhance their shareholders’ wealth unless they simultaneously engage in accounting fraud.  Most firms apprehended for foreign bribery generally did not engage in fraud and after adjusting for regulatory penalties, their average ex ante net present value of their bribery-induced projects is positive.  In a new paper, we develop a model that uses a comprehensive set of bribery enforcement to shed light on the how common foreign bribery is among US-listed firms with foreign sales. Continue reading

Legal Person Liability is a Key Component of the Emerging Rules for the Global Economy

by Kathryn Gordon and Brooks Hickman

The liability of legal persons for foreign bribery and related economic offenses is a key feature of the emerging legal infrastructure for the global economy.  Without it, governments face a losing battle in the fight against the bribery of foreign public officials and other complex economic crimes.

In recognition of the essential role that the liability of legal persons plays in combating foreign bribery, Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention) require “[e]ach Party … to establish the liability of legal persons for foreign bribery” and to apply “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” penalties to legal persons for foreign bribery. Continue reading

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