by Max Rodriguez and Bianca Beam

As discussed in a prior post,[1] last year the Department of Justice announced new pilot programs for whistleblowers in the following U.S. Attorney’s Offices: the Southern District of New York[2]; Eastern District of New York[3]; Northern District of California[4]; Central District of California[5]; District of New Jersey[6]; District of Columbia[7]; Southern District of Texas[8]; Northern District of Illinois[9]; Southern District of Florida[10]; Eastern District of Virginia[11]; and the Western District of Virginia.[12]

Most notably, on August 1, 2024 Main Justice’s Criminal Division announced the Corporate Whistleblower Awards (“CWA”) pilot program aimed at high-priority criminal violations involving bribery, healthcare fraud, sanctions evasion, and other corporate misconduct not already covered by an existing reward program.[13] Although data about the CWA program has been scant so far, the data on whistleblower reward programs in other areas or run by other agencies, including the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, the SEC, CFTC, IRS, and FinCEN programs show the fundamental takeaway: whistleblower reward programs work.[14] They pay for themselves by increasing recovered enforcement dollars and improve the quality of the government’s investigations through valuable information that initiates or advances matters.

But even if we don’t yet know exactly how successful the CWA program has been, DOJ clearly seems to think it is useful because they are now doubling down on bespoke whistleblower reward programs. On July 8, 2025, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division announced a new whistleblower reward program for select criminal antitrust matters (the “Antitrust Whistleblower Reward Program”).[15]

Below, we discuss the new program’s structure, its eligibility criteria for potential whistleblowers, and takeaways about what this new announcement signals about enforcement in the new administration.

An Unusual Multi-Agency Structure

As laid out in the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) that governs the program, the new Antitrust Whistleblower Reward Program is jointly administered with the United States Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”) and the USPS Office of Inspector General (“USPS OIG”).

This multi-agency structure is an unusual one for a whistleblower award program. However, in the particular case of antitrust, it is a sensible one. This joint whistleblower program is a logical extension of their existing partnership given that a coordinated framework had already been established under the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (“PCSF”), a nationwide enforcement effort to detect and prosecute antitrust violations and related fraud affecting government procurement, grants, and program funding.[16] Established in 2019, the PCSF includes the DOJ Antitrust Division, over a dozen U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, and Inspector Generals from key federal agencies such as the USPS.[17]

The statutory division of labor reveals the logic behind the multi-agency structure. The Attorney General — supervising the Antitrust Division — has oversight and authority over all DOJ investigations concerning potential violations of the antitrust laws (and therefore has final discretion over when an action will be pursued).[18] But, critically here, the Postal Service is authorized not only to collect fines, penalties and forfeitures stemming from matters affecting the Postal Service[19] but also “to pay one-half of all penalties and forfeitures imposed for violations of law affecting the Postal Services, its revenues, or property, to the person informing for the same.”[20]

Similarly to the discretionary statutory authority that gave rise to the CWA program,[21]  the structure here follows the “what’s already in the toolbox” approach by rejuvenating an existing authority through the specific application of a whistleblower award program.

An existential question: what “harms” the Postal Service?

Since the reward mechanism comes from USPS’ statutory authority, the Antitrust Whistleblower Reward Program is necessarily narrowed. The question is: how much? Not as much as you’d think.

To potentially recover an award, a whistleblower must report information concerning an “Eligible Criminal Violation”[22] that affects “the Postal Service, its revenues, or property” in a way that leads “the USPIS Official to conclude that the Postal Service has suffered an identifiable harm.”[23] However, this “harm need not be material or otherwise pose any substantial detriment to the Postal Service.”[24]

Past enforcement actions show the Postal Service does not need to have been the victim of an antitrust scheme for “its revenues[] or property” to be implicated, confirming the limitation is not quite as narrow as it would appear. In the past, pursuant to its authority to “investigate postal offenses and civil matters related to the Postal Service”[25] USPS OIG has been involved in civil and criminal enforcement actions relating to price-fixing and bid-rigging schemes in the ready-mix concrete market,[26] asphalt-paving services,[27] e-commerce and online retail,[28] stormwater and drainage infrastructure,[29] and even the pharmaceutical industry.[30]

This enforcement history shows that the Postal Service’s involvement will not need to be central or even direct for a matter to fall within the scope of the Antitrust Whistleblower Reward Program. As a result, reporting on a wide array of anticompetitive conduct to the government could give rise to whistleblower eligibility under the program’s standards.

Whistleblower Eligibility

The eligibility criteria for potential whistleblowers maps closely onto the criteria from other existing whistleblower reward programs. To qualify for an award, a whistleblower must:

“voluntarily provide original information regarding a potential or actual Eligible Criminal Violation” which “USPIS determines reasonably articulates a violation of law affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property, and this information leads to a resolution including a criminal “fine of at least $1 million, or an equivalent recovery from a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement . . . ”[31]

Information is provided “voluntarily” if it is “specific, credible, and timely” that is “directly communicated”, “before a formal demand” or inquiry “regarding the same subject matter” and “where the individual has no preexisting obligation in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution or civil enforcement action to report information” . . . “including as part of an employer’s application to the Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy.”  This is substantially the same requirements at the CWA[32] and SEC whistleblower reward programs.[33] 

Information is “original” if it is “truthful and complete,” meaning it is: (1) “derived from independent knowledge” and not from public sources; (2) “not already known to the Antitrust Division, USPIS, or USPS OIG from any other source;” (3) “not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a government report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the whistleblower is a source of the information;”[34] and (4) “provided for the first time after the” ratification date of the MOU.

As always, a variety of potential exclusionary criteria apply that would make a potential whistleblower’s information not original.[35] Each of the criteria must be absent for the whistleblower to be eligible for an award. The exclusion criteria include that the whistleblower: had not (1) “coerced another party to participate”; (2) was not “clearly the leader or originator” of the activity; (3) was not “an official, employee, or contractor of the Department of Justice, the Postal Service, or any law enforcement organization” or a family member of one or someone who “resided in the same household” as one; and (4) the information was not obtained through (a) an attorney client relationship; (b) the legal representation of a client; (c) a person whose principle duties as an employee or contractor involve compliance or internal auditing; or (d) a means or manner that violates the law.

Most notably, exclusion criteria (1) and (2) sit substantially higher as a culpability threshold than the CWA’s use of the “minimal participant” definition from the Sentencing Guidelines as the ceiling for reward eligibility.[36]

Submission and Review Process

The workflow for the Antitrust Whistleblower Reward Program is laid out in very concrete and clear steps. These steps make clear for whistleblowers and their attorneys who is the proper point of contact, and in what sequence steps should be expected.  

• First: The Whistleblower submits information to the Antitrust Division, USPIS or USPS and the information is forwarded to the Antitrust Division for evaluation.
• Second: The Antitrust Division makes a determination whether the information qualifies as an eligible whistleblower report, meaning it comes from an Eligible Whistleblower and relates to an Eligible Criminal Violation, and if it does sends the information to the USPIS official for assessment.
• Third: The USPIS official will assess whether the information supports “violations of law affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property” per 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(7) and informs the Antitrust Division of its determination.
• Fourth: If applicable, the Antitrust Division “will reflect in its records that the whistleblower report is potentially eligible depending on the subsequent investigation.”
• Fifth: If the investigation “results in a criminal conviction and fine of at least $1 million, or an equivalent recovery from a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement, the Antitrust Division will approve the collection of a portion of the criminal fine or penalty by the Postal Service under 39 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2).” While the Antitrust Division has sole discretion in determining the amount awarded to the whistleblower, it makes this determination in consultation with USPIS and USPS and the total reward will be at a minimum 15% and a maximum of 30% of the recovered criminal fine.
• Sixth: The Postal Service will receive twice the amount of the determine whistleblower reward, retain half and then send the rest to the whistleblower.

Conclusion

Even though the first six months of the Trump administration has carried substantial changes to federal white-collar enforcement activities, the rollout of the new Antitrust Whistleblower Reward Program — shortly on the heels of a revised and mostly-expanded CWA program — shows that DOJ’s enforcement priorities may be shifting substantially, but they are not in full retreat.

This whistleblower reward program rollout also reflects the continuing recognition by federal authorities that whistleblowers are an indispensable part of efficient and impactful enforcement policy, and that it is not just morally right but also good policy to offer them appropriate incentives that recognize their contributions and sacrifices. For whistleblowers and their counsel, the message is clear: if you have credible, timely, and specific information about antitrust misconduct impacting the Postal Service in even the broadest sense, this program may offer not just a viable, but a powerful and well-structured route to reward—and justice.

In short, this is not just another whistleblower program. It’s a signal that whistleblowers are a welcome part of the enforcement landscape, in a way that may continue to grow.

Footnotes

[1] Max Rodriguez, A Thousand Pilot Programs Bloom: DOJ Pushes Forward to Further Welcome Whistleblowers, available at https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2024/03/23/a-thousand-pilot-programs-bloom-doj-pushes-forward-to-further-welcome-whistleblowers/ (March 23, 2024).

[2] Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Williams Announces Enforcement Priorities And SDNY Whistleblower Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-williams-announces-enforcement-priorities-and-sdny-whistleblower-pilot (Jan. 10,2024).

[3] Department of Justice, United States Attorney Breon Peace Announces Whistleblower Non-Prosecution Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/united-states-attorney-breon-peace-announces-whistleblower-non-prosecution-pilot (Sept. 17, 2024).

[4] Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Ismail Ramsey Announces Policies Underlying Whistleblower Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/us-attorney-ismail-ramsey-announces-policies-underlying-whistleblower-pilot-program (March 18, 2024).

[5] Department of Justice, United States Attorney Martin Estrada Announces Implementation of New Whistleblower Pilot Program to Facilitate Increased Prosecutions of High-Level Wrongdoers, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/united-states-attorney-martin-estrada-announces-implementation-new-whistleblower-pilot (Aug. 23, 2024).

[6] Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Philip R. Sellinger Announces Creation of Whistleblower Non-Prosecution Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/us-attorney-philip-r-sellinger-announces-creation-whistleblower-non-prosecution-pilot (Sept. 13, 2024).

[7]Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Announces Implementation of New Whistleblower Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/us-attorneys-office-announces-implementation-new-whistleblower-pilot-program (Sept. 16, 2024)

[8] Department of Justice, SDTX Whistleblower Non-Prosecution Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/sdtx-whistleblower-non-prosecution-pilot-program (Sept. 16, 2024).

[9] Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago Announces Individual Self-Disclosure Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/us-attorneys-office-chicago-announces-individual-self-disclosure-pilot-program (Sept. 16, 2024).

[10] Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Lapointe Announces Southern District of Florida Whistleblower Non-Prosecution Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/us-attorney-lapointe-announces-southern-district-florida-whistleblower-non-prosecution (Sept. 13, 2024).

[11] Department of Justice, New Whistleblower Pilot Program encourages early voluntary self-disclosure of criminal conduct, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/new-whistleblower-pilot-program-encourages-early-voluntary-self-disclosure-criminal (Sept. 14, 2024).

[12] Department of Justice, Whistleblower Non-Prosecution Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdva/whistleblower-non-prosecution-pilot-program (Oct. 3, 2024).

[13] Department of Justice, Criminal Division Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-division-corporate-whistleblower-awards-pilot-program (May 12, 2025); see also, Department of Justice, Department of Justice Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400041/dl?inline (May 12, 2025) (“CWA Guidelines”).

[14] Securities Exchange Commission, Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2024, available at https://www.sec.gov/files/fy24-annual-whistleblower-report.pdf (Nov. 15, 2024); Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Whistleblower Program Customer Education Initiatives, available at https://www.whistleblower.gov/sites/whistleblower/files/2024-11/FY24%20Customer%20Protection%20Fund%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf (Oct. 24, 2024); Department of Justice, False Claims Act Settlements and Judgments Exceed $2.9B in Fiscal Year 2024, available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/false-claims-act-settlements-and-judgments-exceed-29b-fiscal-year-2024 (Jan. 15, 2025); Internal Revenue Service, IRS Whistleblower Office Operating Plan, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p6074.pdf (April 18, 2025); Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Year in Review for Fiscal Year 2024, available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN-Infographic-Public-2025-508.pdf (June 19, 2025).

[15] Department of Justice, Justice Department’s Antitrust Division Announces Whistleblower Rewards Program, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departments-antitrust-division-announces-whistleblower-rewards-program (July 8, 2025).

[16] Justice Department, Procurement Collusion Strike Force, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/procurement-collusion-strike-force (Nov. 5, 2019).

[17] Justice Department, Justice Department Announces Procurement Collusion Strike Force: a Coordinated National Response to Combat Antitrust Crimes and Related Schemes in Government Procurement, Grant and Program Funding, available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-procurement-collusion-strike-force-coordinated-national-response (Nov. 5, 2019).

[18] 28 C.F.R. § 0.40(a).

[19] 39 U.S.C. § 2601.

[20] 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(7).

[21] The CWA is statutorily authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(C), which provides that the U.S. Attorney General is authorized to pay awards in exchange for “information or assistance leading to civil or criminal forfeiture.”

[22] While it is at the discretion of the Antitrust Division to determine whether a potential or actual violation exists, the following categories of criminal offenses are presumptively considered Eligible Criminal violations: (1) “Criminal violations of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act”; (2) “Federal criminal violations committed to effectuate, facilitate, or conceal violations of the Sherman Act”; (3) “Federal criminal violations targeting or affecting federal, state, or local public procurement; and (4) “Federal criminal violations targeting or affecting the conduct of federal competition investigations or proceedings.” Antitrust Whistleblower Program MOU, § IV(A)(4).

[23] Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General Regarding the Whistleblower Rewards Program and Procedures, § IV(A)(4)-(5), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1407261/dl?inline (July 8, 2025) (“Antitrust Whistleblower Program MOU”).

[24] Antitrust Whistleblower Program MOU, § IV(A)(5).

[25] 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(6).

[26] Justice Department, Jury Convicts Two Executives in Longstanding Antitrust Conspiracy to Fix Prices, Rig Bids and Allocate Markets for Concrete, available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/jury-convicts-two-executives-longstanding-antitrust-conspiracy-fix-prices-rig-bids-and (July 12, 2024).

[27] Justice Department, Company Sentenced to Pay $6.5M Criminal Fine for Bid Rigging in Michigan Asphalt Industry, available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/company-sentenced-pay-65m-criminal-fine-bid-rigging-michigan-asphalt-industry (Aug. 15, 2024).

[28] Justice Department, Five Amazon Marketplace Sellers and Four Amazon Marketplace Companies Sentenced for Price Fixing, available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/five-amazon-marketplace-sellers-and-four-amazon-marketplace-companies-sentenced-price-fixing (Aug. 23, 2023).

[29] Justice Department, Former Engineering Executive Sentenced for Rigging Bids and Defrauding North Carolina Department of Transportation, available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/former-engineering-executive-sentenced-rigging-bids-and-defrauding-north-carolina-department (Sept. 8, 2022).

[30] Justice Department, Major Generic Drug Companies to Pay Over Quarter of a Billion Dollars to Resolve Price-Fixing Charges and Divest Key Drug at the Center of Their Conspiracy, available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/major-generic-drug-companies-pay-over-quarter-billion-dollars-resolve-price-fixing-charges (Aug. 21, 2023).

[31] Antitrust Whistleblower Program MOU, § IV.

[32] CWA Guidelines revised May 12, 2025 at § II(4)(a)(i-ii).

[33] 17 CFR § 240.21F-4(a)(3)-(4).

[34] This language closely tracks the False Claims Act disclosure bar at 31 U.S. Code § 3730(e)(4)(A) and mirrors the language in the SEC whistleblower program at 15 U.S. Code § 78u-6(a)(3)(c) and the CWA Guidelines revised May 12, 2025 at § II(2)(e)(3).

[35] Additionally, in instances where the Whistleblower initially reported the Original Information through internal compliance channels and the company later reports that information to the Antitrust Division, the whistleblower’s internal report will be treated as the official disclosure date as long as the individual reports to the Antitrust Division within 120 days of either the internal report or their termination related to it—whichever is later.  

[36] CWA Guidelines revised May 12, 2025, at § II(1)(e) n.4.

Max Rodriguez is Principal and Founder and Bianca Beam is Of Counsel at Law Office of Max Rodriguez PLLC. 

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