In a recent piece published in the Yale Law Journal Forum, I describe data collected concerning prosecutions of banks. I describe how while formerly quite rare, bank prosecutions have increased in numbers and in the size of penalties. I also analyze the approach of prosecutors and ask whether it is sufficiently effective. To add to that analysis, below is a figure displaying, by type of crime, financial institution prosecutions from 2001-2015.
Fig. 1. Financial Institution Penalties in Federal Criminal Prosecutions by Type of Crime, 2001-2015
Another question is what proportion of these agreements were negotiated as non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, versus plea agreements. A detailed Appendix lists each agreement in turn, but the figure below depicts what proportion of the agreements in each year involved deferred and non-prosecution agreements versus plea agreements.
Fig. 2. Financial Institution Prosecutions by Type of Agreement, 2001-2015
Brandon L. Garrett is the Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law at
University of Virginia School of Law and author of Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations, published in 2014.
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