It is perhaps stating the obvious to say that contemporary geopolitical issues are largely shaped by the role of the internet and of a global resurgence of far-right, nationalist movements. The internet, and more specifically, social media, has played a significant role in shaping political rhetorics across the globe; the problem in defining and responding to “Fake News” is becoming a prominent topic. The similarities between many of these movements are striking, with far-right leaders across the globe making appeals to nationalistic histories and condemning any groups perceived as part of an “other,” typically non-white and non-straight minorities. In this paper, I want to examine the relationship between digital communities and the rise of far-right movements in the United States and Europe to argue that digital communities are replacing the nation-state as the binding “imagined community.”
In his book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson proposes a definition of a nation as “an imagined political community.”[1] It is “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in their minds of each lives the image of their communion.” The nation is a community because despite “the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.” This framework can be applied to the political communities that have developed from social media platforms to analyze how these “digital imagined communities” are affecting contemporary geopolitics, specifically by bolstering the resurgence of the far right via social media.
Before analyzing the way that digital technology is working to create these “digital imagined communities,” it’s important to first define what “social media” means, and to define and differentiate the far-right movements of America and Europe. Despite the contemporary prevalence of the term “social media,” the exact definition of this term and what constitutes a form of social media is still contested by scholars. Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein offer a definition in their article “Users of the World, unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media,” in which they define social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.”[2] Web 2.0 is the term used to describe the shift in web development and applications, “whereby content and applications are no longer created and published by individuals, but instead are continually modified by all users in a participatory and collaborative fashion.” User Generated Content is “the sum of all ways in which people make use of Social Media” and “is usually applied to describe the various forms of media content that are publicly available and created by end-users.” This definition stems from an understanding of social media less as an emergent phenomena than a natural evolution of the internet, building off of what Kaplan and Haenlein consider to be the “root” of the internet, intended to be “a platform to facilitate information exchange between its users.”[3] For the purposes of this paper, I will use this understanding of “social media” to refer to platforms, applications, and websites where users can post their own content and have it shared across a given platform and/or the internet at large, and “digital technology” to refer to the underlying structures, processes, and technological advancements that allow these platforms to exist and affect how they function.
A definition for the far-right movement is a similarly elusive. While the ideologies of American and European far right movements are similar, I will begin by outlining their specificities and potential origins. In America, the far right movement is most commonly referred to as the “alt-right,” although the classification of membership is difficult to specify. In his article “History of the Alt-Right” for Salon, George Michael argues that, ultimately, the origins of the alt-right “can be traced to various American white nationalist movements that have endured for decades” and is a movement “concerned about concepts such as nation, race, civilization, and culture.”[4] Within this broad definition there are several factions. On one hand, there’s the public-policy-orientated “intellectual” faction spearheaded by the likes of Richard Spencer, who has worked for several years to legitimize white nationalism as a political movement. On the other hand, digital subcultures have been founded on white nationalism, particularly on social media sites such as 4chan, 8chan, and Gab —although the members of these communities can also be found on more mainstream websites like Facebook, Twitter, and the comment pages of many “liberal” news outlets. On mainstream social media platforms, these digitally-based members of the alt-right will frequently post inflammatory remarks to “troll” other users; the aim of these so-called “trolls” is often to prove controversy on the internet only to claim “free speech censorship.” Through these visible provocations, these “trolls” work to increase visibility of the movement while also working to legitimize the movement’s image as being an appeal to an intellectually rigorous ideology. When considered together, the two groups — the public-policy intellectuals working in think tanks and lobbying groups, and the “trolls” emerging from the subcultures of social media — work to amplify the visible presence of the alt-right and to push for public policy that fits their agenda.
American alt-right groups often appeal to reconstructions of American history, as seen in the success of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan. Online, these various communities appeal to different narratives, such as the split between the “neo-reactionary” and “radical traditionalist” sects of the movement. Neo-reactionaries are among the more extreme fringes of the alt-right, frequently arguing that modernity and technical progress have caused a regression in humankind; they are often anti-democracy, and advocate for a government ruled by an authoritarian figure that would act like a CEO/king hybrid. On social media platforms like 4chan, these ideologies often get combined with the messaging and imagery of internet culture and frequently culminate in white supremacist memes.[5] There are also groups like the “radical traditionalists,” who claim to want to restore traditional Christian values but do so from a “uniquely white supremacist perspective.”[6] The strongest binding commonality between these groups is their belief in white supremacy.
While these fragmentations are relevant in identifying the origins and varying goals of the broader movement, for the purpose of this essay it is best to generalize the movement as a fragmented political movement united in the aim of implementing white nationalist policies that are often rooted in nostalgia. In other words, despite emerging from differing narratives and various motives for participation in far-right discourses, these factions still function holistically as an “imagined community” of extreme conservatism. Despite being connected primarily through the internet — and thus, living in different nations and on different continents — these members of the far right are still bound by their feelings of comradeship to the far-right movement and act accordingly.
European far-right movements are similarly fragmented, yet there are still striking similarities across borders. Due to its recent memory of the Franco dictatorship that ended in 1975, Spain stands out as a European country that has resisted the far-right nationalism that has emerged throughout the rest of the continent.[7] However, the emergence of the “Vox” far-right party on the national stage in the most recent elections is challenging that status. In other countries, such as Hungary, the far right movement is already beginning to yield significant political power; in April, Hungary’s far-right Prime Minister Viktor Orban was elected for a third term in office by a landslide.[8]
One explanation for what unites these far right movements is what Elif Shafak refers to as “Imperial Nostalgia” in his article for The Guardian titled “It’s not Just Europe — toxic imperial nostalgia has infected the world.” Far Right movements that have emerged in Britain, Hungary, Russia, and Turkey all use rhetoric appealing to their respective nation-states’ imperial legacies to push an authoritarian agenda. This mode of thinking often appeals to a “deliberately selective” narrative of history, that “sweeps the darker sides […] under the carpet” and “imposes from above a version of history that is one-sided, distorted, and biased.” Shafak describes how Turkey President Erdoğan’s “Ottomanism” calls for an erasure of facts that diminish the “glories” of the empire, and how academics and journalists who question these historical reconstructions are fired, blacklisted, or even arrested.[9] To varying degrees across European far-right movements, leaders appeal to the heights of their respective nation-state’s imperial regime and erase parts of history that are unfavorable to these narratives of greatness. These inaccurate narratives have catalyzed far-right political movements in Europe: from nostalgic yearning for empires of the past comes nationalistic pride and its associated racism, homophobia, and xenophobia. Almost all of the far-right movements across Europe portray themselves as a response to the migrant crisis, with many being built on platforms that are strictly anti-immigration and encourage xenophobic attitudes towards and policies against non-white immigrants.
Another explanation is the rise of “identitarian” politics. The Economist describes this “identitarian right” as “sprawl[ing] across borders” so activists from Scandinavia, Italy, Germany, and America can collaborate. It “aims to to change politics by spreading ideas and setting the terms of political debate. [The identitarian right] activists call this ‘metapolitics.’”[10] As in America, internet communities play a significant role in shaping and spreading these ideas, with the recently elected president of Italy, from the predominant far right Lega party, going as far as to directly thank Facebook for his success.[11] As in the American “alt-right” movement, European movements see a similar fragmentation between policy-driven intellectuals and cyber-communities of “troll” activists whose tactics complement each other, leading to material political outcomes.
In both the American and European far-right movements, segmented far-right parties use revisionist historiographies and ideologies to unite and coordinate action. In other words, their various “means” still combine together to work towards a singular “end” of white-supremacy-based nationalism. Despite this advocacy for nationalism, these communities are increasingly communicating with one another across borders and continents to coordinate action, recruit new members, and use the advantages of each community. Social media platforms have allowed for “nationalism” to become “globalized,” with political groups using the internet to teach and learn from one another. Jacob Davey and Julia Exner’s 2017 study, “The Fringe Insurgency,” explains this contradiction saying that “high levels of opportunism characterize today’s extreme right, as seen in the cooperation between ideologically disparate strands such as racially and culturally oriented nationalists,” because they are primarily seeking “to overcome ideological and geographic divergences for the sake of expanding their influence, reach, and impact.” Their goal is more to shift the “Overton Window” of political discourse, recruit new members, and to elect far-right politicians than it is to have an entirely ideologically unified community. Davey and Exner’s analysis shows that “the extreme right is currently ahead of the curve on at least three levels” because “they are early tech adopters, they know how to work together, and they know how to speak to the young.”[12]
There are three main reasons why social media is used by these communities: 1) for pragmatic, personal reasons; 2) because it creates self-fulfilling filter bubbles; and 3) it creates a sense of community for individuals who would otherwise feel isolated in mainstream society or feel afraid to express their views. Similarly, there are two fundamental explanations for symbiotic relationship between the alt-right and the internet: 1) algorithms in search engines and news feeds, and 2) the “flattening” and decontextualization of historical context. The net effect is that these far-right movements, despite espousing ethnocentric and/or nationalistic ideals, are partially enabled by the globalizing forces of social media, and need to be considered in an adaptation of Anderson’s framework as acting as a “digital imagined community.”
One core aspect of why social media platforms are fundamental to the success of the far-right movement is that the anonymity they provide users allows members of the far-right to express their beliefs without harming their personal or professional life; thus, it’s “pragmatic” for white supremacists to use social media platforms that allow them to spread these ideas. This produces an arguably co-dependent relationship with the cyber communities on which they thrive. Since there are often such severe repercussions, such as the loss of jobs and personal relationships, when one is “outed” as a white nationalist, it is often more practical for members of these communities to remain relatively anonymous and rely on social networks and community boards such as Facebook, Twitter, 4chan, and Reddit. Thus, “success” for the far right can often be less dependent on traditional metrics of social movement success — participation in marches and rallies, electing officials, and policy success wins — but rather on the “survival of the movement’s ideas.”[13] This also partially explains how the fragments of far right movements can still be “united” under the same term, or, in Anderson’s terminology, can still be considered as a singular “imagined community.” It matters more that the core ideas of the movement are continued to be propagated so public discourse can shift in their favor.
These corners of the internet often create “filter bubbles” that serve to further develop and legitimize fringe radical views. Many social media platforms used by the far right end up as communities almost exclusively used by and for the far right. The social media platform “Gab” is one example of this process. Gab was created to be the “free speech” alternative to Twitter and takes the stance that no speech on its platform should be censored, which has led to Gab becoming a digital “epicenter” of conspiracy theories and blatant racism. While in theory people who identify with leftist politics are allowed to join, the site has become almost exclusively used by the alt-right.[14] A similar phenomena can be found on other social media platforms – or on channels within platforms like /pol/ (politically incorrect) on 4chan – where again, in theory, any political discussion is allowed, but channel threads end up essentially taken over by the alt-right.
One of the most significant ironies of these movements is that, despite claims that their speech is being censored and that the left is overly-sensitive, white supremacists’ own online communities censor away ideas that differ from their own and cannot themselves withstand critique. Thus, these cyber communities often consist entirely of far-right members, and share their own subculture of memes, colloquial digital language, and in-group references and mentality.[15] The more that the far right isolates itself into these corners of the internet, the more it generates in-group references that make it increasingly difficult to follow conversations, and the more they end up acting as an “imagined community.” However, a discussion of the prevalence of memes and the layers of ‘ironic’ humor used by these communities is beyond the scope of this paper. To discuss digital imagined communities, it’s important to understand that users of these threads do not know the real identities of the users they interact with, yet understand themselves to be acting as a unified community against mainstream society and politics.
Finally, these message boards are often sources of community for people who may otherwise feel neglected and oppressed by mainstream society. This is perhaps seen most clearly in the rise of “incel” subculture on various platforms like Reddit and 4chan. The term “incel” is short for involuntary celibacy, and refers to men who want to lose their virginity but cannot find a sexual partner; via subreddits and forums, this community has become radically (and sometimes even violently) misogynistic.[16] However, Angela Angle argues in her book, Kill the Normies, that all these various factions — meaning all the various subcultures that thrive on the far-right corners of the internet, including incels — share “a fear of the future” and “an atomized life spent forever alone.” By offering a space that understands these fears, “the alt-right can seduce and assimilate these groups, lending them a sense of coherent identity.”[17] In other words, far-right social media spheres have emerged as places for people to find a sense of community that they previously could not find. A discussion on the specifics of how social media radicalizes these communities is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is relevant to understanding why contemporary far right movements needed the internet in order to achieve the relative success that they have had. Without the anonymity of social media platforms, these communities could not exist in the way that they have come to.
It is also essential to note, however, that although the spread of white supremacist ideology largely happens anonymously on social media platforms, there are physical, tangible effects of these ideologies spreading. Take, for instance, the FBI’s 2018 report that hate crimes have risen in America for the past three consecutive years.[18] Most recently, this manifested in violent Islamophobic attacks on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. The white supremacist terrorist who streamed a portion of his attack on FaceBook Live, allegedly said “subscribe to PewDiePie” on camera, and posted an 87-page manifesto on Twitter and 8chan shortly before he began his attack..[19] PewDiePie is a highly-subscribed-to YouTuber known for meme commentary and video game content, and is loosely associated with online anti-semitism and the neo-Nazi movement. His use of social media in a violent attack was intended to make his white supremacist platform go viral, which underlines the importance of understanding social media’s role in bolstering the far-right and creating digital imagined communities .
Furthermore, social media platform design does not play a neutral role in aiding these communities. While the aforementioned anonymity of digital communities often ‘frees’ members to voice controversial opinions, algorithms used by social media platforms often lead people towards more radicalized, right wing perspectives. Take, for instance, the research that YouTube algorithms are commonly responsible for guiding a person from videos of American “mainstream” conservative personas like Ben Shapiro to videos espousing alt-right views.[20] At the heart of this issue is whether mainstream social media platforms have a responsibility to remove radical content, as exemplified in 2017’s “Advertisergate” scandal on YouTube. White nationalists argue that removing or demonetizing their content is a violation of their free speech rights, despite the fact that the Terms and Conditions of platforms often specify guidelines for content and delineate that these privately-owned platforms are not obligated to maintain a constitutional level of freedom of speech.[21] Their content, however, thrives precisely because of the relatively unregulated nature of these websites. A fundamental reason for the success of far-right content on YouTube is that these YouTubers are not held to the journalistic standards of mainstream news outlets. There is no fact-checking done for YouTube videos, and as a result, far-right YouTubers are able to spread their perspective without concern to historical accuracy or factual truths.
It is through understanding the emergence of far-right movements into national electoral politics in America and in Europe—and the role that social media has played in fostering these movements—that we can begin to analyze these movements as a transcontinental digital imagined community. Both the European and American movements use nostalgic but inaccurate histories to justify exclusionary politics, and both include individuals who operate in the traditional political sphere to push white nationalist agendas, as well as an active, and often intentionally inflammatory, cyber community.
These historically inaccurate narratives would not be so powerful, and maybe not even constructed, without social media and digital technology. As Rob Kroes argues, the internet has meant that “the same page would be the interchangeable element of a virtual data bank that one penetrates into by the use of a key word that opens many books at the same time.[22] All information is thus put at the same plane, without the logical hierarchy of an unfolding argument.” This can be directly seen on the aforementioned controversial /pol/ (politically incorrect) threads on 4chan, where historical facts and figures are inserted without context (and sometimes, are blatantly false), as well as on YouTube, where YouTubers on the far right can spread conspiracy theories without repercussion due to the fact that there’s no regulation, fact-checking, or journalistic obligation to tell the truth. Furthermore, the deconstruction of “logical hierarchies” is embedded into the design of websites like 4chan and 8chan, making conversations difficult to follow, full of in-group references that make them even harder to understand to the casual observer.[23] Thus, there is a relationship between digital technology itself and enabling the spread of far right politics via social media platforms and the digital communities they foster.
These communities have had an undeniable impact on politics across the globe, and an examination of future reverberations of these digital communities is worthwhile. Building off of Anderson’s definition of the “imagined community,” these digital communities can be understood as “imagined communities” in a similar manner. These communities fit in the framework of being “imagined”—they feel united in their purpose despite the fact that their identities are hidden and many will never meet in person—and are a community because they have a “comradeship” that unites them despite vast differences such as their geographical location. However, it’s not only the far right that relies on the internet to unite communities of people who share the same politics—those on the left are susceptible to the same critique regarding filter bubbles and algorithmic radicalization. Perhaps as people continue to engage in political discussions on the internet in this manner, they are often coming to identify more with the various groups that they belong to online than they do with their local communities and even their nation-states.[24] For example, the leaders of the “idententarian” political movement that coordinates transatlantic messages are perhaps more united by their “identarian” bend than they are their nation; i.e., their vision of the future of their countries has more binding communal power than the lived reality of their present nation-state. As the Pew identified in 2016, this can be seen in the fact that members of each political party in America view the opposing party as a “threat” to the future of America.[25]
Understanding the role of these digital imagined communities and how they function is necessary to understanding the complexities and animosity of contemporary geopolitics. With opposing groups observing growing animosity to the other, and with political discussions often occurring in isolated echo chambers that are unable to effectively communicate across the political spectrum, the future of civic discourse could be in a perilous position; the stakes of this are further raised by the rising use of violence by the most extremist individuals of these communities. Further research needs to be done, and recommendations subsequently made, on how to curb the growth of these radical movements on the internet. At the core of the issue is the question of regulation: what is the compromise between free speech and hate speech on digital platforms, can this distinction be regulated, and do platforms have a greater social responsibility to monitor and remove this sort of content? On one hand, these questions blur the line of digital privacy and censorship, and call into question the scope of the First Amendment (at least in America). On the other hand, these movements present a threat to existing political systems and often advocate using violent rhetoric, if not outright violence, against minority groups. In order to begin to fully understand the potential long-run implications of the intersection of digital media and the far-right, these groups need to be taken seriously as legitimate imagined political communities, and questions need to be raised regarding the internet’s role in the democratic process and the compatibility of white supremacy and digital presence.
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[1] Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 2016.
[2] Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein. “Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media.” Business Horizons, 53, no. 1, 2010, p. 59–68., doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2009.09.003.
[3] Ibid.
[4]George Michael. “History of the Alt-right: The Movement Isn’t Just Breitbart and White Nationalists – It’s Worse.” Salon. November 25, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2018 https://www.salon.com/2016/11/24/history-of-the-alt-right-the-movement-is-not-just-breitbart-and-white-nationalists-it-is-worse_partner/.
[5] Dylan Matthews. “The Alt-right Is More than Warmed-over White Supremacy. It’s That, but Way Way Weirder.” Vox.com. August 25, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2018. https://www.vox.com/2016/4/18/11434098/alt-right-explained.
[6] “Alt Right: A Primer about the New White Supremacy.” Anti-Defamation League. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/alt-right-a-primer-about-the-new-white-supremacy.
[7] Raphael Minder. “Spain’s Far-Right Vox Party Sees Breakout Moment in New Election.” The New York Times. February 16, 2019. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/world/europe/spain-elections-vox-far-right.html.
[8] “Europe and Nationalism: A Country-by-country Guide.” BBC News. September 10, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006.
[9] Elif Shafak. “It’s Not Just Europe – Toxic Imperial Nostalgia Has Infected the World | Elif Shafak.” The Guardian. December 10, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/10/nostalgia-for-empires-lost-seductive-dangerous.
[10] “How ‘identitarian’ Politics Is Changing Europe.” The Economist. March 28, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/03/28/how-identitarian-politics-is-changing-europe.
[11] Mark Di Stefano. “Italy’s New Far-Right Star Specifically Thanked Facebook For The Election Result. Of Course He Did.” BuzzFeed. March 07, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.buzzfeed.com/markdistefano/italys-new-far-right-star-specifically-thanked-facebook.
[12] Mack Lamoureux. “The Extreme Right Is More Global Than Ever.” Vice. October 23, 2017. Accessed December 12, 2018. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59ypnn/the-extreme-right-is-more-global-than-ever.
[13] Emma Grey Ellis. “The Alt-Right Doesn’t Need to Be Visible to Succeed.” Wired. August 16, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/alt-right-doesnt-need-visible-to-succeed/.
[14] Jane Coaston. “Gab, the Social Media Platform Favored by the Alleged Pittsburgh Shooter, Explained.” Vox. October 29, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/29/18033006/gab-social-media-anti-semitism-neo-nazis-twitter-facebook.
[15] Emma Grey Ellis. “Gab, the Alt-Right’s Very Own Twitter, Is The Ultimate Filter Bubble.” Wired. June 03, 2017. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.wired.com/2016/09/gab-alt-rights-twitter-ultimate-filter-bubble/.
[16] Allie Conti. “Learn to Decode the Secret Language of the Incel Subculture.” Vice. June 26, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7xmaze/learn-to-decode-the-secret-language-of-the-incel-subculture.
[17] Roisin Kiberd. “‘Kill All Normies’ Is About the Alt-Right But the Left Ends Up Looking Worse.” Motherboard. May 12, 2017. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bmwdm5/kill-all-normies-is-about-the-alt-right-but-the-left-ends-up-looking-worse.
[18]John Eligon. “Hate Crimes Increase for the Third Consecutive Year, F.B.I. Reports.” The New York Times. November 13, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/us/hate-crimes-fbi-2017.html.
[19] Jen Kirby. “The New Zealand Shooter Wrote a Manifesto. An Extremism Expert Explains What It Means.” Vox. March 18, 2019. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.vox.com/2019/3/18/18267682/new-zealand-christchurch-shooter-manifesto-online-extremism.
[20] Zack Beauchamp. “The Alt-right Loves YouTube.” Vox. October 15, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/15/17979118/youtube-alt-right-two-reports.
[21] Carlos Maza. “YouTube’s Messy Fight with Its Most Extreme Creators.” Vox. Last modified October 19, 2017. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.vox.com/videos/2017/10/19/16504062/strikethrough-youtube-fight-extreme-right-wing-creators.
[22] Rob Kroes. “Contemporary Conflicts.” Anti-Americanism: A Revisit. Accessed March 20, 2019. http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/USA/kroes/.
[23] Andrew Thompson. “The Measure of Hate on 4Chan.” Rolling Stone. June 25, 2018. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-measure-of-hate-on-4chan-627922/.
[24] “The Rise of the European Far-Right in the Internet Age.” EuropeNow. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/01/31/the-rise-of-the-european-far-right-in-the-internet-age/.
[25] “Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016.” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. December 14, 2017. Accessed March 20, 2019. http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/.