Spring 2018

CESS Experimental Economics Seminar

(all seminars take place at 12:30 PM, 19 W 4th street, room 517)

Weekly Seminar: Andrea Robbett, “Voter Expression and Information Acquisition in Common Value Elections” (Thursday, May 3, 2018)

Andrea Robbett
Andrea Robbett is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Middlebury College. She received her PhD from Caltech in 2011. Her research uses lab experiments to address topics related to public economics, labor economics, social dilemmas, and voting. This talk will focus on a series of experiments investigating expressive voting and rational ignorance among American political partisans.



Weekly Seminar: Pietro Ortoleva, “Econographics” (Thursday, April 26, 2018)

Pietro Ortoleva
Pietro Ortoleva is a Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Princeton University.  He received his Ph.D. from New York University, and taught at Caltech and Columbia before joining Princeton.  His research focuses on decision theory, experimental economics, and behavioral economics in general, especially on behavioral political economy.  More recently he has been working on the relation between time and risk preferences, both theoretically and experimentally; on theoretical models on the persistence of mis-specified models in complex environments; and on large-scale incentivized surveys on representative samples, with a particular focus on the correlation between behavioral aspects.



Weekly Seminar: Fabio Maccheroni, “Multinomial Logit Processes and Preference Discovery: Inside and Outside the Black Box”, (Thursday, April 12, 2018)

Fabio Maccheroni
Fabio Maccheroni is a Professor of Decision Sciences at Bocconi (Milano). He works on Decision Theory, Game Theory, and Mathematical Finance. More recently, he started working on topics in Computational Neuroeconomics and Discrete Choice Analysis.


Weekly Seminar: Alex Imas, “The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence”, (Thursday, March 22, 2018)

Alex Imas
Alex Imas is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Behavioral Science at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and an Assistant Professor of Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University. Imas’ research spans a variety of topics across economics and psychology. He has studied how prior losses and gains affect risk-taking, the use of prosocial incentives to motivate performance, and the ways in which people use others’ emotions strategically.



Weekly Seminar: Daniel Martin, “Inattention to Game Form: A Theory of the WTA/WTP Gap”, a joint work Edwin Munoz Rodriguez, Northwestern (Thursday, March 15, 2018)

Daniel Martin
In this paper, we use inattention to provide a theoretical microfoundation for “game form misrecognition” in the context of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism.  Our model provides a map between the probabilistic beliefs of individuals about game form and price offers that are made in the BDM.  We use this map to show that inattention always produces a gap between Willingness-to-Accept (WTA) offers and Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) offers, even when there is no endowment effect.  At the same time, we show it is possible to identify the endowment effect even when subjects are inattentive to game form.  To test this approach, we elicit probabilistic beliefs about game form in an experiment that replicates the design of Cason and Plott (2014).


Weekly Seminar: Christine Exley, “Motivated Framing Effects” (Thursday, March 8th, 2018)

Christine Exley is an Assistant Professor in the Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit at Harvard Business School.  Much of her work examines how individuals develop excuses to justify their behavior.  She more broadly examines motives for prosocial behavior and how gender influences labor market outcomes.



Weekly Seminar: Philipp Strack, “Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions” (Thursday, March 1st, 2018)

Regret and its anticipation affect a wide range of decisions. Jobseekers reject offers waiting for an offer to match their best past offer; investors hold on to badly-performing stocks; and managers throw good money after bad projects. We analyze behavior of a decision maker with regret preferences in a dynamic context and show that regret agents have a disposition to gamble until a payoff matching the best past offer is received. Results from a lab experiment confirm that many subjects exhibit such behavior and are reluctant to stop below the past peak.