by Isabella Yang*
The academic landscape is decorated with various methods used to build conceptual understanding but genealogy stands out as an encyclopedic approach that transverses the past, present, and future. Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality and Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism provide two distinct genealogy accounts. Though both authors are united in pursuing a historical exposition of the present, their approaches diverge. Nietzsche segments morality into goodness and guilt and performs a genealogical assessment of each to refine his genealogy of morality. Weber inspects Protestantism and capitalism and induces a causal relationship to explain the correlation between the two. Though Nietzsche’s argumentation is more cogent and compelling, both accounts bestow depth and texture to the reader’s conception of the self and society.
I. Nietzsche’s Interrogation of Morality: Goodness, Guilt, and God
The schematic structure of Nietzsche’s engagement with genealogy is straightforward: Nietzsche severs and silos his analysis of morality into two parts. In his first essay, he analyzes the historical elements that converge to delineate the concept of goodness. In his second essay, he applies the same method to elucidate the idea of guilt. Nietzsche anatomizes the genealogy of morality into the genealogy of goodness and guilt. Though the two concepts are explored separately, they constellate to inform Nietzsche’s notion of morality. Nietzsche traces goodness and guilt from a pre-moral to moral context to explain how the two ideas have become definitional to morality.
Nietzsche introduces the reader to his personal intellectual genealogy – the “English psychologists,”1 his ancestors in moral genealogy. The English psychologists observe moral valuations and assign a theory to explain them without availing themselves of historical context: they see that unegotistical acts are deemed good by the benefactors of those acts, but Nietzsche rejects the conflation of good and useful because the definition of ‘good’ cannot derive from the recipients of goodness. Nietzsche instead posits that the original “breeding ground”2for the idea of ‘good’ stems from political and social hierarchies. The nobles perceived themselves as good; the nobles defined ‘bad’ by contrast, emboldened by the “pathos of distance”3 between themselves and commoners. The foundational sense of superiority the noble class exerted against commoners formed the system of master morality and the origin of the distinction between good and bad. Language evidences this hierarchy, supporting Nietzsche’s claim that concepts of good and bad do not find their genesis in morality but in political and social hierarchy: Greek words for good translate to the “mighty” or the “rich,” and Latin words for good translate to “warrior,” implying that ‘good’ was defined by what the social context desired in its people.4 The Greeks revered power and wealth, while the Romans prioritized military prowess. Political superiority parlays itself to psychological superiority, implying that ‘good’ began as a political structure, not a moral one.5
The idea of ‘good’ takes on a moral connotation with the slave revolt, which inverted the “aristocratic value equation”6 – only the poor and powerless were good now. Slave morality is definitionally reactionary; its revolt emerges when ressentiment takes on a creative spirit and supplants old values with new ones. The creative spirit here emanates from revenge against and hatred of the oppressive power of the noble. In an act of vengefulness, slave morality inverts the paradigm set forth by master morality: what the noble considers ‘good,’ slaves consider ‘evil.’ Slave morality is devoid of the self and the present – it looks outward, an insidious feature that Nietzsche believes has perverted Europe by making people nihilistic, indifferent, and acquiescent to stagnation. Nietzsche’s other contentions with slave morality are manifold, but in the scope of Nietzsche’s genealogical treatment of ‘good’ as parcel to the greater question of morality, Nietzsche concludes by noting the primordial tension between ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ and ‘good’ versus ‘evil,’ with the latter dichotomy afforded by slave morality winning out for now. Master morality shaped the origins of ‘good’ while slave morality moralized the idea of ‘good.’
In the second essay, Nietzsche applies the same genealogical method to expound on guilt. The similarity in the German words for guilt and debt implies that original conceptions of guilt were devoid of allusions to morality. Punishment also follows as an expression of compensation, not of guilt. Guilt and punishment find their genesis in the creditor-debtor relationship, mainly due to man’s station as a being “who values and measures.”7 An element of transaction and reciprocity underlies pre-moral notions of guilt and punishment. The origin of “bad conscience,”8 or guilt, results from the dissipation of hunter-gatherer societies and the ensuing “internalization of man”9 – when bestial instincts that used to be released externally had to be turned inwards. The moralization of this guilt occurs when bad conscience is “woven together with the concept of God.”10 The idea of bad conscience combines with indebtedness to frame the transformation of guilt into a moral concept: the Christian God, the ultimate creditor, sacrificed himself out of love for his debtors, creating a relationship of eternal debt. Debt towards God becomes an “instrument of torture”11 because man recasts the animalistic instincts he is supposed to internalize as guilt before God. The magnitude of indebtedness and impossibility of repayment is so great that men create concepts of eternal punishment and original sin to garner some semblance of equilibrium. Debt is at the nucleus of guilt; debt to God defines the moralization of guilt. The genealogy of goodness and guilt consummate a “synthesis of meanings” that define morality.12
II. Weber’s Investigation of the Religion of Capitalism
Weber’s engagement with genealogy follows a different trajectory than Nietzsche’s: Weber marries empirical scrutiny with conceptual analysis to deduce a causation sequence between the spirit of capitalism and the Protestant ethic. Nietzsche takes a more holistic approach to deduce the history of morality, while Weber asks specifically how religion has shaped the formation of the spirit of capitalism. Nietzsche takes one subject and construes its history by separating it into subparts. Weber’s engagement with genealogy is more complex: he looks at two forces, religion and the spirit of capitalism, and examines interactions between the two to clarify the origins of capitalism. Though both authors engage empirical inquiry, Weber’s serves as a basis for his conceptual propositions about the interplay between the spirit of capitalism and Protestantism.
Weber starts by looking at capitalism: he turns to Benjamin Franklin’s “philosophy of avarice”13 and the idea that an individual’s duty to increase their capital is an end in itself. Man’s life purpose is acquisition. Here, the foundation of capitalism’s social order surfaces: the fulfillment of “one’s duty in a calling”14is earning money. Having established the basis of the capitalist spirit, Weber then attempts to interrogate the origin of such a basis. However, Weber can only tell the reader what the origin is not: the capitalist spirit did not emerge as a “reflection…of economic situations.”15
Weber then uses this idea of a calling as a theoretical bridge between the capitalist spirit and Protestant asceticism: the Reformation introduced the idea that the highest moral activity of the individual was the “fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs.”16In line with the capitalist notion of worldly duty, the Reformation solidified and deified the idea of a calling by increasing the moral and religious “sanction of organized worldly labor in a calling.”17 The Lutheran concept of a calling asks man to accept his calling as a “divine ordinance.”18 Weber qualifies his above analysis by saying that the Lutheran idea of a calling has “questionable importance”19to the development of capitalism; it has some influence, but Weber prefers to look at other sects, like Puritanism, to deduce the connection between practical life and religious impetus. Weber uses the Puritan minister Richard Baxter to concretize the relationship between the capitalist spirit and Protestant asceticism. According to Baxter, wasting time by not working is the most deadly sin because it contravenes “God’s commandment…to work for divine glory.”20 God ordains labor, licensed as a calling, because it systematizes man, which worldly asceticism requires.
Weber’s attempt at genealogy surfaces most prominently here: he says that rational labor and a fixed calling ethically justify modern ideas of “specialized division of labor”;21the capitalistic notion of comparative advantage is tied to the Puritan ideal of becoming highly skilled at a calling to “serve the common good”22 and God. The capitalistic tendency towards “standardization of production” stems from the Puritan propensity for a “uniformity of life,”23 both of which are rooted in the monastic aversion to enjoying worldly pleasures. These structures of standardization, afforded by Protestant asceticism, beget a capitalist economy by spawning “unusually industrious workmen” who adhere to their work as a “life purpose willed by God.”24 Capitalism thrives on the populace’s unquestioning devotion to labor; Luther’s notion of a calling as God’s will and Baxter’s idea concerning the divinity of labor provide a linear pathway between Protestantism and the capitalist order. Another central tenet of capitalism is the exploitation of the working class – Protestant asceticism ensures and beautifies this tenet in two ways. First, by psychologically sanctioning the concept of labor as a calling and second, by framing employers’ “business activity,” which is essentially the exploitation of this “specific willingness to work,” as a calling.25 Protestant asceticism endows divine authorization to this parasitic worker-employer relationship that is endemic to capitalism.
Weber’s genealogical analysis of Protestantism and capitalism never transcends correlation. Weber cannot identify a clear chain of causality between the two ideas, only theories that overlap, such as the idea of a calling and duty. Weber seems to argue that the Protestant sanction of a calling and labor as a duty primes man for the capitalist economy but is unable to categorically identify how the former caused the latter. His genealogical treatment of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism lapses on two levels: first, the initial framing of his genealogy is fragile at best. Weber has a conclusion in mind from the outset – that Protestant asceticism is tied to the formation of the capitalist spirit – which taints his ability to be objective. Whereas Nietzsche poses an open question – what is the history of morality – and allows his engagement with genealogy to guide his answer, Weber poses a conclusion and generates a causal relationship to confirm the empirical correlation he observes. Weber reads as verifiably siloed in his conclusion, making Nietzsche’s account more convincing. Second, Weber fails to reach the essence of genealogy concerning his question of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. Weber successfully traces historical parallels between Protestantism and capitalism – both revolve around a calling and labor as a duty – but he only succeeds in identifying them as two separate ideas that run parallel. The point at which they intersect, interact with each other, and exert mutual influence is absent. Weber cannot identify how the capitalist system began, confounding his ability to provide a holistic genealogical evaluation. Weber also defaults to explanations of traditionalism, the system that established pre-capitalist labor standards, but still fails to demonstrate a causal link between traditionalism and capitalism.
III. Applications of Nietzsche and Weber’s Intellectual Tutelage
At best, Weber forwards a compelling image of the interdependence and overlap between Protestant ideals and its capitalist manifestations. But that is not to say Weber’s portrait is devoid of value. Weber emboldens readers to be critical of the purported separation of church and state. Even if the two entities are separate, it calls into question the separation of church and self because even the most ardent anti-capitalist must interact daily with capitalist structures. Just as Luther dignifies labor as being ordained by God, individuals living under capitalism feel a tacit, ostensibly secular version of this divine ordinance. The omnipresent and omnipotent invisible hand consecrates diligent contributions to the capitalist fabric. Images that guide capitalism mirror religious symbols: the American dream asks people to defer present pleasure for future prosperity, just as Protestant ideas ask people to postpone earthly pleasure to achieve salvation in the afterlife. Weber’s paramount contribution is in making readers think more critically about the rampant parallels between capitalism and Christianity. Society no longer conceives of labor as
predestined by God but decreed by capitalism. Weber asks readers to interrogate whether capitalism, as an entity weaponized to justify mechanized labor, has replaced God in society’s framing of the relationship between self and work.
Nietzsche’s historical explanations enrich the reader’s understanding of the self. Individuals have inherited ideas of morality, virtue, and guilt from society and absorbed such definitions as if they were self-made. Nietzsche encourages readers to interrogate how much their perception of the world stems from personal rumination versus passive acquiescence to existing structures, similar to the distinction between master and slave morality. Nietzsche’s work thus reads as a microcosm of the two systems of morality, reminding readers that the nihilism and indifference that slave morality spawns is a choice that can be countered by self-reflection. Nietzsche imbues his engagement with genealogy with an element of self-knowledge; his approach is not solely scholastic in that it necessitates a degree of introspection to comprehend his musings on morality.
Tracing an institution or idea back to its birthplace is arduous, convoluted, and often nonlinear. Nietzsche and Weber’s genealogical accounts shoulder the grueling task of navigating history’s relationship to the present in retrograde.
Endnotes
1 Friedrich, Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morality: First Essay. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10.
2Ibid, 11.
3Ibid, 11.
4Ibid, 15.
5Ibid, 15.
6Ibid, 17.
7 Friedrich, Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morality, 45.
8Ibid, 39.
9Ibid, 57.
10Ibid, 62.
11Ibid, 63.
12 Friedrich, Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morality, 53.
13 Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: Religious Affiliation and Social Stratification. (London, 1930), 17. 14Ibid, 19.
15 Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 20.
16Ibid, 40.
17Ibid, 42.
18Ibid, 44.
19Ibid, 45.
20Ibid, 106.
21Ibid, 109.
22Ibid, 107.
23Ibid, 114.
24 Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 120.
25Ibid, 121.
Works Cited
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Preface, First Essay, Second Essay.” Essay. In On the Genealogy of Morality, edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson, 3–67. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Weber, Max. “Religious Affiliation and Social Stratification, The Spirit of Capitalism, Luther’s Conception of the Calling: Task of the Investigation, Asceticism and the Spirit of Cwapitalism.” Essay. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904/1905), edited by Talcott Parsons and R. H. Tawney, 1–50-102–25. London, 1930.
*I’m a rising senior studying Business with concentrations in Management and Data Science and a minor in math. I was in Berlin for the spring semester of 2023 and I loved it! Since then, I have been back I have been interning with a consulting firm, specializing in technology. I’ve always really enjoyed reading and writing, which is why I loved the courses at NYU Berlin so much. Some of my favorite authors are Baldwin, Dostoevsky, and Steinbeck!