“Replication Data for: UN Security Council Membership: Increased Security and Reduced Conflict”, Alastair Smith and James Vreeland 2022, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5VWFYP, Harvard Dataverse
“US Leader-to-Leader Diplomatic Visits Dataset, 1946-2019” Matt Malis; Alastair Smith, 2022, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/2ZNR5R
“National Political Leaders and Causes of Death”, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/U1MYGI,
A New Indicator of Coalition Size: Tests Against Standard Regime-Type Indicators
Smith, Alastair M., 2022, “Replication Data for: A New Indicator of Coalition Size: Tests Against Standard Regime-Type Indicators”, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UYLXRO,
Institutional Change as a Response to Unrealized Threats: An Empirical Analysis: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith: Forthcoming at the Journal of Conflict Resolution. All data and other replication materials are available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/E6IARM.
The Logic of Political Survival
by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith Randolph Siverson and James Morrow.
The data, additional results and the programs required to replicate our results are available athttp://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data.shtml.
Election Timing
I have a British Journal of Political Science article. Due to space constraints the editors requested that I suppress part of the analysis from that article. It is included here as an electronic appendix.
I have also written a book, “Election Timing”, Cambridge University Press 2004, which is reviewed inPerspective in Politics. The data related to that project can be found here.
Replication Data for: A Political Economy of Income Tax Policies
Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises
Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith Journal of Conflict Resolution. April 2002 Vol 46. No. 2 pp. 175-200.
The mathematical appendix to this article was exclude at the request of the editor. It appears here as a pdf file.
Abstract. We examine the role of an honest record in the credibility of diplomatic communications: why, on the brink of a crisis, an aggressive state may be deterred by a claim to resist. In contrast to traditional arguments linking credibility to a reputation for resolve, power, or strength, we posit that credibility arises from the expectation of future, continued gains from retaining an honest record. Diplomatic statements are believed only if a country’s or leader’s credibility is unmarred. Leaders keep their word so that they are believed in later crises. Two environments are contrasted: one in which a country’s record for honesty resides within the country as a whole and another in which reputation resides with individual leaders. In this later case, citizens have an incentive to remove leaders caught bluffing. More robust than previous reputation theories, this model also offers comparative statics for when diplomacy will be more effective, namely when leaders are domestically accountable.
Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation.
The data and statistical routines for this paper.
Abstract: If we believe that politics involves a significant amount of strategic interaction then classical statistical tests, such as Ordinary Least Squares, Probit or Logit, cannot give us the right answers. This is true for two reasons: The dependent variables under observation are interdependent– that is the essence of game theoretic logic– and the data is censored — that is an inherent feature of off the path expectations that leads to selection effects. I explore the consequences of strategic decision making on empirical estimation in the context of international crisis escalation. I show how and why classical estimation techniques fail in strategic settings. I develop a simple strategic model of decision making during crises. I ask what this explanation implies about the distribution of the dependent variable: the level of violence used by each nation. Counterfactuals play a key role in this theoretical explanation. Yet, conventional econometric techniques take no account of unrealized opportunities. For example, suppose a weak nation (B) is threatened by a powerful neighbor (A). If we believe that power strongly influences the use of force then the weak nation realizes that the aggressor’s threats are probably credible. Not wishing to fight a more powerful opponent, nation B is likely to acquiesce to the aggressor’s demands. Empirically, we observe A threaten B. The actual level of violence that A uses is low. However, the theoretical model suggests that B acquiesced precisely because A would use force. Although the theoretical model assumes a strong relationship between strength and the use of force, traditional techniques find a much weaker relationship. Our ability to observe whether nation A is actually prepared to use force is censored when nation B acquiesces. I develop a Strategically Censored Discrete Choice (SCDC) model which accounts for the interdependent and censored nature of strategic decision making. I use this model to test existing theories of dispute escalation. Specifically, I analyze Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s (1992) dyadically coded version of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Gochman and Moaz 1984). I estimate this model using a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation method. Using Bayesian model testing, I compare the explanatory power of a variety of theories. I conclude that strategic choice explanations of crisis escalation far out-perform non-strategic ones.
The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita
Alastair Smith
Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of government Finance
Forthcoming American Journal of Political Science
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita
Alastair Smith
Foreign Policy and Policy Concessions
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
Alastair Smith
Abstract
Data
Punishing the Prince
Fiona McGillivray
Alastair Smith
Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith
Comparative Political Studies (forthcoming)
A Political Economy of Foreign Aid
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith
Forthcoming at International Organizations
Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights
International Studies Quarterly (2005) 49, 439-457
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
Feryal Cherif
George Downs
Alastair Smith
Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War
World Politics April 2004 56(3): 363-388.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
Alastair Smith
Randolph Siverson
James Morrow
The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Relations Between States
Fiona McGillivray
Alastair Smith
Tenure, promotion and performance: The career path of US ambassadors. Eric Arias and Alastair Smith. 2018. The Review of International Organizations. 13(1):77-103. Replications